Three dogmas of metaphysical methodology
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2019.1.32707Keywords:
metaphilosophy, bias, progressAbstract
In this paper, Jessica Wilson identifies dimensions through which there can be philosophical progress. Further, she brings to the fore the problem of the lack of shared standards among philosophers, standards that enable the evaluation of philosophical theses. Wilson argues that this problem puts three barriers for philosophical progress: it generates intra-disciplinary siloing; gives room for sociological determinants to take over (on the question of which philosophical theses should be considered or evaluated) and encourages bias. Finally, Wilson gives some suggestions regarding how to deal with those barriers.
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