On the nature of ignorance
Absence of knowledge or absence of true belief?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2021.2.40050Keywords:
Epistemology, Ignorance, Absence of Knowledge, Absence of True BeliefAbstract
This article presents an introduction to the discussion between two relevant alternatives that dispute the definition of propositional ignorance, namely, the Standard View and the New View. For the first one, ignorance is the absence of knowledge; for the second one, the absence of true belief. Considering this divergence, each of these alternatives will be exposed given how they define ignorance, the possible kinds of ignorance, and the specific conditions for propositional ignorance. In addition, its advantages and disadvantages regarding propositional ignorance will be contrasted from the following points: uses in natural language and linguistic intuitions, theoretical unification, ability to deal with cases of true belief or justified true belief that are not knowledge, and, finally, relations between ignorance and blameworthiness. Thus, this article aims to contribute to the dissemination in Portuguese of a recent but growing discussion in contemporary analytical epistemology.
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