Is philosophy a science?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2019.2.32723Keywords:
nature of philosophy. recursive thought. metaphilosophy. universality of philosophy’s content. philosophical methodology. “genitivist” conception of philosophy. sciences of culture.Abstract
To deal with the question whether philosophy is a science, we have first to ask about the nature of philosophy. We first note that philosophizing is a recursive form of thinking, and in this it is analogous to mathematics. Secondly, the general scheme of any philosophical question is: “What is X?”. This, however, doesn’t tell us very much, since the history of philosophy shows that practically anything may be substituted for the variable X. And, then, it is difficult to argue that a discipline that deals with anything may be considered a scientific discipline. With respect to its content, it would appear that philosophy shouldn’t be regarded as a scientific discipline. On the other hand, from a methodological standpoint the result of our reflections is different: it is a characteristic feature of any scientific discipline that it proceeds in a rigorous and intersubjectively controllable manner. (Good) philosophy satisfies both methodological requirements. But, furthermore, there is an understanding of philosophical activity that may be regarded as scientific also by its content: the genitivist conception of philosophy. According to it, the term “philosophy” always has to be accompanied by a genitive denoting some kind of human cultural product (language, science, religion, morals, etc.). Under this interpretation, philosophy would then be one of the sciences of culture, and therefore a science itself.
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MOULINES, C.U. “¿Es la filosofía una ciencia?”, Ágora - Papeles de Filosofía, Santiago de Compostela, v. 28, n. 2 (2009), p. 21-36. ISSN 2174-3347. © Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2009. Direitos reservados.
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