The Principle of Proliferation against the argument by elimination. The case of the social sciences

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2019.3.35261

Keywords:

Principle of Proliferation .Interdependent evaluation. Argument by elimination. Relative merits

Abstract

In order to criticize the defense of the Principle of Proliferation made by Feyerabend we will evaluate to what extent the social sciences benefit from the fact that they shelter a considerable diversity of theories and methodologies. In spite of being a reality in social disciplines, proliferation is never seen as capable of increasing the testing of a theory by contrasting it with alternatives. Social scientists disbelieve that there
are potential falsifiers to a theory that only other theories are able to locate. Having to deal with explanatory diversity, the social sciences come into conflict with the thesis that, by virtue of each theory having access only to certain facts, disregarding alternative theories implies let the facts they locate off lightly. The multiplication of theories has been fought by means of the argument by elimination whereby the social
theories already formulated are scrutinized with the aim of demonstrating their flaws and pointing out an alternative to them as the only acceptable because it is the only survivor to rigorous empirical evaluation. We will point out the reasons why social scientists make a massive use of the argument by elimination against duplication or multiplication theories. Considering that social theories do not test each other, proliferation
is deprived of the epistemic advantages attributed to it by Feyerabend. Even if reciprocal testing is possible it is useless because if there are facts located only by certain theory they do not serve to evaluate other theories.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biography

Alberto Oliva, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, RJ.

Doutor em Filosofia (UFRJ) – Rio de Janeiro. Professor Titular do Depto.de Filosofia da UFRJ. Pesquisador 1-C do CNPq. – Brasil

References

AMSTERDAMSKI, S. Between Experience and Metaphysics. Trad de P. Michalovoski, Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-1797-8

BENDIX, R.; BERGER, B. Images of Society and Problems of Concept Formation in Sociology. In: GROSS, L. (org.). Symposium on Sociological Theory. Evanston: Row, Petersen & Co., 1959.

BOTTOMORE, T. B. Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature. Nova Iorque: Vintage Books, 1972.

BRAITHWAITE, R. B. Scientific Explanation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

COLL INGWOOD, R. G. An Essay on Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948.

DURKHEIM, É. Le Suicide. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967.

DURKHEIM, É. Les Formes Élementaires de la Vie Religieuse. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,1968. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839413272-038 DOI: https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839413272-038

FEYERABEND, P. Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism. In: FEIGL , H. & MAXWELL , G. (org.). Scientific Explanation, Space and Time. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962.

FEYERABEND, P. Problems of Empiricism. In: COLODNY, R. (org.). Beyond the Edge of Certainty. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

FEYERABEND, P. Problems of Empiricism, Part. II. In: COLODNY, R. G. (org.). The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. Pittsburgo: University of Pittsburg Press, 1970.

FEYERABEND, P. Science in a Free Society. Londres: Verso, 1978.

FEYERABEND, P. How to be a Good Empiricist – A Plea for Tolerance in Matters Epistemological. In: NIDDITCH, P. H. (org.). The Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977a.

FEYERABEND, P. Consolations for the Specialist. In: LAKATOS, I & MUSGRAVE, A. (org.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977b.

FEYERABEND, P. Reply to Criticism. Comments on Smart, Sellars and Putnam. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981a. Vol. 1. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139171526.007 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171526.007

FEYERABEND, P. Introduction: Proliferation and Realism as Methodological Principles. Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981b. Vol. 1. https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139171526.009 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139171526.009

FEYERABEND, P. Two Models of Epistemic Change: Mill and Hegel. Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. Vol. 2.

FEYERABEND, P. Farewell to Reason. Londres: Verso, 1987.

FEYERABEND, P. Against Method. Londres: Verso, 1993.

FEYERABEND, P. Killing Time. Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 1995.

FEYERABEND, P. Outline of a Pluralistic Theory of Knowledge and Action. In: PRESTON, J. (org.). Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Philosophical Papers 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999a. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101210110

FEYERABEND, P. Knowledge without Foundations. In: PRESTON, J. (org.) Knowledge, Science and Relativism. Philosophical Papers 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999b. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101210110 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819101210110

GODFREY-SMITH, P. Theory and Reality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

GOETHE, J. W. Maxims and Reflections. Trad. de Elisabeth Stopp. Londres: Penguin, 1998.

GOULDNER, A. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Nova Iorque: Basic Books, 1970. https://doi.org/10.3817/0970006338 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3817/0970006338

HABERMAS, J. A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism. The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology. Londres: Heinemann, 1977.

HESSE, M. ‘Theory and value in the social sciences’. In: HOOKWAY; PETTIT (org.). Action & interpretation. Studies in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.

JARVIE, I. C. Thinking about Society: Theory and Practice. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1986.

KUHN, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In: NEURATH, O. CARNAP,R. & MORRIS, C. (org.). Foundations of the Unity of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970. Vol. II.

LAKATOS, I. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research

Programmes. In: LAKATOS, I.; MUSGRAVE, A. (org.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

LAUDAN, L. Beyond Positivism and Relativism. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

LEWIS, O. Life in a Mexican Village: Tepoztlan Restudied. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.114.2966.470-a DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.114.2966.470-a

LUKES, S. Emile Durkheim. His Life and Work: a Historical and Critical Study. Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977.

MARX, K. Critique of Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’. Trad. de Annette Jolin e Joseph O’Malley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

MILL , J. S. On Liberty. Ontario: Batoche Books Limited, 2001.

MILL , J. S. A System of Logic. Londres: Longmans Green and Co. 1949.

MISES, L. von. The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science. Princenton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962.

NEURATH, O. Empiricism and Sociology. Editado por Marie Neurath e R. Cohen. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2525-6 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2525-6

POINCARE, H. Science et Méthode. Paris: Ernest Flammarion Éditeur, 1912.

POPPER, K. R. Normal Science and its Dangers. In: LAKATOS, I.; MUSGRAVE, A. (org.). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

POPPER, K. R Realism and the Aim of Science. Londres: Routledge, 1996.

PRESTON, J. Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science and Society. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.

PRESTON, J. Paul Feyerabend. In: ZALTA, E. (org.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Disponível em: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/feyerabend/.

PUTNAM, H. Degree of Confirmation and Inductive Logic. The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Illinois: The Open Court Publishing, 1963.

REDFIELD, R. Tepoztlan: A Mexican Village. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.

SCHMAUS, W. Durkheim’s Philosophy of Science and the Sociology of Knowledge. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994.SCHUMPETER, J. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Nova Iorque: Harper and Row, 1950.

SOROKIN, P. A. Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965.

WEBER, M. Economy and Society an Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Trad. de Ephraim Fischoff et alii, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

WHITEHEAD, A. Adventures of Ideas. Nova Iorque: The Free Press, 1961.

WORRAL, J. Is the Empirical Content of a Theory Dependent on its Rivals? In: NIINILUOTO; TUOMELA, R. (org.). The Logic and Epistemology of Scientific Change. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1978.

Published

2019-12-31

How to Cite

Oliva, A. (2019). The Principle of Proliferation against the argument by elimination. The case of the social sciences. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 64(3), e35261. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2019.3.35261