THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF EXPERIENCE: THE RECIPROCITY OF THE NOTIONS OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT

Authors

  • Alexandre Teles (UFRGS)

Abstract

In this paper we present our conception of method of proof of Kant’s transcendental deduction developed elsewhere: we ascribe it a regressive argument, which includes a reply to Hume’s skepticism, for, differently from Ameriks (1978) who has understood the transcendental deduction as starting from the premiss that “we have some empirical knowledge”, we understand the transcendental deduction as starting from a definition of experience. This definition is the link of the debate between Kant and Hume. After this presentation, we show how the reciprocity of the notions of subject and object are exigencies of that definition of experience itself and that is the task of the transcendental philosophy to explain how (through which power of knowledge?) this demand can be reached. KEY WORDS: Kant. Transcendental deduction. Transcendental argument.

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Published

2009-10-13

How to Cite

Teles (UFRGS), A. (2009). THE PRIMARY REQUIREMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF EXPERIENCE: THE RECIPROCITY OF THE NOTIONS OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT. Intuitio, 2(2), 124–130. Retrieved from https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/index.php/intuitio/article/view/5947

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2009)

Section

Articles

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