The shorf dream of a perpetual democracy
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2001.1.67Abstract
The article addresses the issue of democracy in major contexts such as the European. According to the author, the European Union’s constitution favors an increased correspondence between the political territory of regulation and the economic space, but it makes evident the deleterious weight of the executive, in which commissaries not subjected to democratic controls are in charge of political initiative. Thus, for the author, the European Union’s development conditions national policies and weakens parliament, what, if doesn’t condemn the process, draws the attention to one of its weaknesses.Downloads
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Published
2007-05-03
How to Cite
Becker, J. (2007). The shorf dream of a perpetual democracy. Civitas: Journal of Social Sciences, 1(1), 81–96. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2001.1.67
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