Contributions of international Political Economy to the theoretical comprehension of the relation between the IMF and developing countries
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-7289.2017.1.24570Keywords:
IMF. Developing countries. Negotiations. Interests. Rational action.Abstract
While there is consensus that the IMF succeeded in extending globalization and the domination of finance to developing countries, the relationship between the IMF and developing countries is not a link in which invariably the former imposes and the latter complies, nor one in which the organism necessarily disagrees with countries’ non-fulfilments. Understanding the historical sense of the relationship and the changing balance of power between actors requires analysing the negotiations through which conflicts between these actors emerge and are resolved. The aim of this paper is to present a contribution on the theoretical status of the relationship between the IMF and the developing countries, considering their role as main borrowers, based on the contributions of the International Political Economy (IPE) concerning the importance of interests as well as those of Sociology concerning the criticism of rational action. We propose a famework of analysis that considers the relationship between the IMF and a developing country as a complex and dynamic link whose result is not determined in advance.
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