Notas para um balanço atualizado da abordagem computacional da mente

César Fernando Meurer

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44571

Autores

César Fernando Meurer Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense (UENF), Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9504-0325

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2024.1.44571

Palavras-chave:

Representações mentais, Conexionismo, Computacionalismo estrutural, Mecanicismo

Resumo

O artigo propõe um balanço atualizado da abordagem computacional da mente, minudenciando aspectos conceituais e críticos. O balanço é pautado por três afirmações ‒ α) A mente humana é um sistema computacional; β) A mente humana pode ser descrita como um sistema computacional; γ) Sistemas computacionais precisam de conteúdo representacional ‒, a partir das quais mostro que o computacionalismo clássico se articula em termos de α∧γ e que as vertentes contemporâneas são melhor caracterizadas em termos de α∧~γ ou β∧~γ. Por fim, após analisar uma série de objeções, argumentamos que o computacionalismo do século XXI é um programa de pesquisa filosoficamente relevante e que os críticos da abordagem computacional da mente incorrem em anacronismo quando se limitam a criticar as vertentes clássicas.

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Biografia do Autor

César Fernando Meurer, Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense (UENF), Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil.

Professor associado de Filosofia no Laboratório de Cognição e Linguagem da Universidade Estadual do Norte Fluminense. Sua formação inclui graduação, mestrado e doutorado em Filosofia, bem como estágios pós-doutorais no Brasil e no exterior. Suas pesquisas focam em questões filosóficas e científicas relativas à linguagem, à mente e ao tempo.

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