Moore against the sceptics

Jody Azzouni

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41521

Autores

Jody Azzouni Tufts University, Somerville, Massachusetts, United States.

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41521

Palavras-chave:

Ónus da prova, Debates, G. E. Moore, Conhecimento, Ceticismo

Resumo

A “Prova de um mundo externo” de Moore e suas “Quatro formas de ceticismo” há muito intrigam os comentaristas. Como são essas respostas adequadas aos céticos? Até que ponto a chamada prova de um mundo externo é pertinente para o desafio do ceticismo? A noção de ônus da prova relativizada é introduzida: este é um ônus da prova vis-à-vis o oponente que se assume ao tentar convencer alguém de algo. O ônus da prova relativizado é tornar explícito (no tópico do discurso racional) o truísmo de que se você argumentar com alguém com a intenção de tentar convencer alguém de algo, e se você não conseguir, você não encontrou sua própria conversação meta. Assumir que Moore está implicitamente contando com a noção de fardos relativizados da prova ilumina sua abordagem nesses artigos.

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Biografia do Autor

Jody Azzouni, Tufts University, Somerville, Massachusetts, United States.

Ph.D in Philosophy from CUNY Graduate Center, NY, United States; MS in Mathematics from Courant Institute, New York University, NY, United States; MA in Philosophy from New York University, NY, United States; BA in Liberal Arts, major: philosophy, New York University, NY, United States. Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University, Medford MA, United States.

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