What we do and presuppose when we demonstrate: From semantics to meta-pragmatics

Eduarda Calado Barbosa; Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho

doi:10.15448/1984-6746.2020.3.38525

Autores

Eduarda Calado Barbosa Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, CABA, Argentina. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2478-9670
Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG, Brasil https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0584-3424

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2020.3.38525

Palavras-chave:

Demonstrativos, Saliência, Atenção conjunta, Pressuposição, Meta-pragmática

Resumo

Neste artigo, defendemos que demonstrativos são expressões de atenção conjunta. Apesar de esta ideia não ser exatamente nova na literatura filosófica ou linguística, argumentaremos aqui que seus defensores ainda não mostraram como combinar tais observações com teorias mais tradicionais de demonstrativos. Nosso propósito é, então, preencher essa lacuna. Nós argumentaremos que atividades de atenção coordenada são mais bem integradas a uma teoria de demonstrativos como informação meta-pragmática. Defenderemos dois pontos. Primeiramente, que pressupor pragmaticamente a saliência do referente é um aspecto fundamental de se usar demonstrativos (algo previsto por sua semântica e meta-semântica). Em segundo lugar, sustentaremos que a pragmática de demonstrar só pode ser apropriadamente entendida em relação a condições meta-pragmáticas que têm a ver com a atenção conjunta. Nós usaremos testes de intuições de “gaps” de valor de verdade como evidência para tal alegação. Nossa proposta nos provê com uma visão completa do que os falantes fazem e pressupõem quando se engajam em atos de referência demonstrativa através da linguagem.

Downloads

Não há dados estatísticos.

Biografia do Autor

Eduarda Calado Barbosa, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, CABA, Argentina.

Postdoctoral fellow at (CONICET), IIF-SADAF / CONICET, Argentina. He holds a doctorate in philosophy from the Graduate Program in Philosophy at the Federal University of Minas Gerais.

Felipe Nogueira de Carvalho, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais (UFMG), Belo Horizonte, MG, Brasil

Is a postdoctoral researcher in philosophy at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (Brazil), as part of the CAPES-PrInt program. He holds a PhD in philosophy from the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (France) and is the author of Demonstrative Thought: a Pragmatic View (De Gruyter, 2016).

Referências

AKHTAR, N.; GERNSBACHER, M. A. Joint attention and vocabulary development: A critical look”. Language and linguistics compass, v. 1, n. 3, p. 195-207, 2007. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-818X.2007.00014.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-818X.2007.00014.x

ÁLLAN, S, & SOUZA, C. B. A. Tomasello›s approach of the evolution of human cognition and language. Psicologia: Teoria e Pesquisa, Brasília, DF, v. 25, n. 2, p. 161-168, 2009. https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-37722009000200003 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-37722009000200003

AUSTIN, J. L. Philosophical papers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979.

BERTENTHAL, B. I.; BOYER, T. W. The development of social attention in human infants. In: PUCE, A.; BERTHENTAL, B. I. (ed.). The many faces of social attention, Cham: Springer, 2015. p. 21-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21368-2_2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21368-2_2

BUTTERWORTH, G.; COCHRAN, E. Towards a mechanism of joint visual attention in human infancy. International Journal of Behavioral Development, London, GB, v. 3, n.3, p 253–272, 1980. https://doi.org/10.1177/016502548000300303 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/016502548000300303

BUTTERWORTH, G.; JARRETT, N. What minds have in common is space: Spatial mechanisms serving joint visual attention in infancy. British journal of developmental psychology, Leicester, GB, v. 9, n. 1, p. 55-72, 1991. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00862.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-835X.1991.tb00862.x

CAMPBELL, J. Joint attention and common knowledge. In: EILAN, N. et al. (ed.). Joint attention: Communication and other minds: Issues in philosophy and psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 287-297. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0013 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199245635.003.0013

CHOMSKY, N. Lectures on Government and Binding. Dordrecht: Foris, 1984.

CLARK, E.V. Awareness of language: Some evidence from what children say and do. In: SINCLAIR, A.; JARVELLA, R.J.; LEVELT, W. J. (ed.). The child’s conception of language. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1978. p. 17-43. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-67155-5_2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-67155-5_2

CLARK, E.V. First language acquisition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

CLARK, H. H.; SCHAEFER, E. F. Dealing with overhearers. In: CLARK, H. H.; Arenas of language use. 1992. p. 248-297.

CLARK, H. H.; WILKES-GIBBS, D. Referring as a collaborative process. Cognition, Amsterdam, NL, v. 22, n. 1, p. 1-39, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(86)90010-7 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(86)90010-7

DIESSEL, H. Demonstratives: Form, function and grammaticalization. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1075/tsl.42 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1075/tsl.42

DIESSEL, H. Demonstratives, joint attention, and the emergence of grammar. Cognitive linguistics [s. l.], v. 17, n. 4, p. 463-489, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1515/COG.2006.015 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/COG.2006.015

DIESSEL, H. Where do grammatical morphemes come from? On the development of grammatical markers for lexical expressions, demonstratives, and question words. MS, University of Jena, 2011.

DONNELLAN, K. Reference and definite description. Philiosophical Review, [s. l.], v. 75, p. 281-304, 1966. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183143 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2183143

FREGE, G. Uber Sinn und Bedeutung. In: FICHTE, I. H.; ULRICI, H. (ed.). Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik. [s. l.], p. 25–50, 1892.. English Translation: On Sense and Meaning. In: MCGUINESS, B. (ed). Frege: collected works. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984. p. 157–177

GOLDIN-MEADOW, S. Hearing gesture: How our hands help us think. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 2005. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1w9m9ds

GRICE, H. P. Studies in the ways of words. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press, 1989.

GRICE, H. P. Utterer’s meaning and intention. The philosophical review, [s. l.], v. 78, n. 2, p. 147-177, 1969. https://doi.org/10.2307/2184179 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2184179

HORN, L. Toward a Fregean Pragmatics: Voraussetzung, Nebengedanke, Andeutung. In: KECSKES, I.; HORN, L. (ed.). Explorations in Pragmatics: Linguistic, Cognitive and Intercultural Aspects. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2007. p. 39-69

KAPLAN, D. Demonstratives. In: ALMOG, J.; WETTSTEIN, H.; PERRY, J. (ed.). Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. p. 481-504

KORTA, K; PERRY, J. Critical pragmatics: an inquiry into reference and communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Mind & Language Press, 2011. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511994869 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511994869

LEVINE, J. Demonstrative Thought., [s. l.], v. 25, n.2, p. 169-195, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01385.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01385.x

LEVINSON S. C. Deixis. In: HORN, L.; WARD, G. (ed.). The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell: New Jersey, 2004. p. 97-121. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470756959.ch5 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470756959.ch5

LEWIS, D. Scorekeeping in a language game. In: BAÜERLE, R.; EGLI, U.; VON STECHOW, A. (ed.). Semantics from a Different Point of View. Berlin: Springer, 1979. p. 172-187. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-67458-7_12 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-67458-7_12

MICHAELSON, E; REIMER, M. Reference. In: ZALTA, E.N. (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (Spring 2019 Edition). Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=reference. Accessedon: June 20th, 2020.

MARTI, G. The essence of genuine reference. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Dordrecht, Holanda, NL, v. 24, n.3, p. 275-289, 1995. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01344204 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01344204

MORALES, M. et al. Gaze following, temperament, and language development in 6-month-olds: A replication and extension. Infant Behavior and Development, Norwood, NJ, US, v. 23, n. 2, p. 231-236, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(01)00038-8 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0163-6383(01)00038-8

MUNDY, P.; ACRA, F.C. Joint Attention, Social Engagement, and the Development of Social Competence. In: MARSHALL, P.J.; FOX, N.A. (ed.). The development of social engagement: Neurobiological Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. p. 81-117. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168716.003.0004 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195168716.003.0004

PERRY, J. Reference and reflexivity. Stanford: CSLI, 2001.

ROBERTS, C. Information structure: Afterword. Semantics and Pragmatics, [s. l.], v.5, n 7, p.1-19, 2012. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.7 DOI: https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.5.7

ROBERTS, C; SIMONS, M.; BEAVER, D. & TONHAUSER, J. Presupposition, conventional implicature, and beyond: a unified account of projection. In: KLINEDIST, N.; ROTHSCHILD, D. (ed.). Proceedings of the ESSLLI 2009 Workshop: New Directions in the Theory of Presupposition. Bordeaux, France, 2009. p. 1-15.

STALNAKER, R. C. Pragmatic Presuppositions. In: M. MUNITZ, M.; UNGER, P. (ed.). Semantics and Philosophy. New York: New York University Press, 1974. p. 197-214.

STALNAKER, R. C. Assertion. In: COLE, P. (ed.). Pragmatics. New York: New York Academic Press, 1978. p. 315–332. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004368873_01 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004368873_013

STALNAKER, R. C. Common Ground. Linguistics and Philosophy, Dordrecht, Holanda, NL, v. 25, n. 5-6, p. 701-721, 2002. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020867916902 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020867916902

STRAWSON, P. F. On referring. Mind, Oxford, v. 9, p. 320–44, 1950. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.235.320 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.235.320

STRAWSON, P. F. Introduction to Logical Theory, London: Methuen, 1952.

STRAWSON, P. F.Identifying reference and truth-values. Theoria, [s. l.], v.30, n. 2, p. 96-118, 1964. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1964.tb00404.x DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1964.tb00404.x

TOMASELLO, M. “The key is social cognition”. In: GENTNER, D.; GOLDIN-MEADOW, S. (ed.). Language in mind: Advances in the study of language and thought, Cambridge (MA): MIT press, 2003. p. 47-57.

TOMASELLO, M. Culture and cognitive development. Current Directions in Psychological Science, [s. l.], v. 9, n 2, p. 37-40, 2004. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00056 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00056

TOMASELLO, M.; FARRAR, M J. Joint attention and early language. Child development, Chicago, Ill., US, v.57. n.6, p. 1454-1463, 1986. https://doi.org/10.2307/1130423 DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/1130423