Freud and Brentano: More than a Philosophical Flirt

Abstract

It would not be exaggerated to to say that the importance of the relationship between Freud and Brentano has been neglected. Although the issue has not been ignored, among the names that influenced Freud, Brentano’s is certainly one of the most deleted. This essay aims to highlight some imprints of the philosopher in the formulation of metapsychology. We begin by highlighting the historical evidence of the closeness of the relationship Freud-Brentanto. Next, we investigated the concept of intentionality in order to emphasize the proximity of Brentano and Freud’s conceptions about the representation in two main points: the first is the impossibility that an act of representation occurs in the absence of the represented object and the second is the fact that the represented object does not necessarily exist as a real thing. After these developments, we conclude by pointing to other brentanians imprints on Freudian theory and therefore to the richness of this research.