LAURENCE BONJOUR’S EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION THEORY

Authors

  • Kátia M. Etcheverry (PUCRS) PUCRS/Brasil

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to present a brief overview of some of the main difficulties Classical Foundationalism has been through since Descartes; second, to introduce the way Laurence BonJour contemporarily thinks we might face these difficulties. In a few words, his proposal is that empirical justification depends ultimately on justified basic beliefs about the contents of sensory experience. The justificational status of these beliefs does not depend on inference from any further beliefs (thus ending the epistemic regress). Because of the character of the ‘constitutive awareness of content’, BonJour claims, the epistemic qualification of the basic beliefs is infallible in a way that partly agrees with the foundationalists’ traditional conception. KEY WORDS: Classical Foundationalism. Epistemic Justification. Laurence BonJour

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Published

2009-10-13

How to Cite

Etcheverry (PUCRS), K. M. (2009). LAURENCE BONJOUR’S EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION THEORY. Intuitio, 2(2), 38–45. Retrieved from https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/intuitio/article/view/5935

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2009)

Section

Articles

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