Descartes and Spinoza: Idea, judgement, and doubt

Authors

  • Mariana de Almeida Campos (UFRJ) UERJ/UFRRJ

Abstract

This article aims at showing how Descartes and Spinoza distinctly approach the following subjects: the concepts of the Idea, the Theory of Judgement, and Doubt as an experience. By analyzing Cartesian solutions to these problems, as well as Spinoza´s critical view of them, I intend on delineating complementary as well as points of rupture between these two theories. As such, I will give special emphasis to those arguments in which Spinoza, in his philosophical system, denies the faculty of reason and, in consequence, rejects Descartes´ concept of Doubt, as well as Suspending Judgement, thus establishing a theory of judgement counterposed to that formulated by Descartes.

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Author Biography

Mariana de Almeida Campos (UFRJ), UERJ/UFRRJ

Mariana de Almeida Campos é graduada em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, e tem Mestrado em Filosofia pela Universidade Estadual do Rio de Janeiro. Atualmente, é doutoranda pela Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, e é Professora Substituta do Instituto Multidisciplinar da Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro. E-mail de contato: [email protected]

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Published

2009-06-20

How to Cite

Campos (UFRJ), M. de A. (2009). Descartes and Spinoza: Idea, judgement, and doubt. Intuitio, 2(1), 162–180. Retrieved from https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/ojs/index.php/intuitio/article/view/5382

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 1 (2009)

Section

Articles

License

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