Quid est veritas? The critical to the realism of the language in Nietzsche

Abstract

The realistic perspective of the language elaborated for Plato considers that the words and concepts represent absolute entities, abstract, independent of the mind human being. The critical one of Nietzsche to this related conception consists of the hypothesis of that the words that constitute the daily vocabulary and the proper structure of the grammar do not express an internal subsistent essence. Intending to destroy the foundations axiologics of the Metaphysical conception of the language, Nietzsche considers that the language is a mere convention, developed to facilitate the domain of the gregarious man on the nature. The words are only denominations granted to objects so that if it prevents the clutter of the speeches, what it approaches the philosopher of the nominalist theory of the language. For Nietzsche, if the words and the apparatus of the language do not express the essences of the things, are not possible to grant to the truth a Metaphysical character, but yes a conditional statute for the necessities circumstantial, relative human beings and to the set of values and ideas that constitute the vision of world of the dominant group that establishes the linguistic codes. As overcoming of the platonic realism, Nietzsche considers the perspectivismo of the language, considering that a speech or absolute truths does not exist, but only singular interpretations on the things. This research, therefore, intends to elucidate the reflections undertaken for Nietzsche concerning the nature of the language, demonstrating its critical positioning before this question and the proposal of the perspectivismo as possibility of overcoming of the dogmatism in the philosophy.