Does the No-Miracles Argument commit the Base Rate Fallacy? Presentation, State of the Art and Formalization Difficulties
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2018.1.31468Keywords:
Filosofia das Ciências, Argumento do Milagre, Realismo, Probabilidade, Inferência à Melhor Explicação.Abstract
We aim to discuss Colin Howson's objection, presented in his book Hume's problem, according to which the no-miracles argument (henceforth, NMA) commits the base rate fallacy. By base rate fallacy, we mean the prior
probability value of a particular hypothesis or theory T, P(T), neglect. In turn, in one of its versions, NMA asserts that only assuming that a mature scientific theory T is approximately true does not make its predictive success a miracle.
When probabilistically formalized, Howson argues that NMA conclusion, the probability that a theory T is approximately true is large, only follows if we assume for T a non-negligible value. Howson's objection aroused two categories
of reaction in the specialized literature: supposing that NMA commits the base rate fallacy, some authors proposed to abandon NMA as an argument for cientific realism epistemological thesis, while others argued that only one version of NMA commits the base rate fallacy; arguing that NMA does not commit the base rate fallacy, some authors have pointed ou some difficults in NMA probabilistic formalization, while others have sought to refine such formalization so that the new one would avoid the fallacy in question. After presenting this state of the art, we will investigate whether or not the probabilistic formalization of the no-miracles argument is reasonable. We will discuss whether or not it ccommodates the nature of inference to the best explanation presupposed in NMA. Finally, we will briefly outline some difficulties for Howson's objection when it is assumed that NMA instantiates, rather, a Peircean abduction.
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