A Bayesian Approach to the Preface Paradox
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2018.1.31460Keywords:
Paradoxo do Prefácio, Tese Lockeana, Graus de Crença, Probabilidade.Abstract
Is logic a normative science for reasoning? Do its principles play any role in the rationality of our beliefs? Being logically consistent is supposed to be a principle for the theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, it seems that logical consistency imposes a constraint on rational belief. However, the preface paradox puts this principle to the test, since the ‘state of preface’ would be a rational state. We will present an analysis according to a Bayesian model of degrees of belief in order to exemplify a (dis)solution of the paradox and, simultaneously, the maintenance of the principle of consistency.Downloads
References
BEALL, J. C.; RESTALL, G. Logical Pluralism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006.
BRANQUINHO, J.; GOMES, N.; MURCHO, D. Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006.
CHRISTENSEN, D. Putting Logic in its Place: Formal Constraints on Rational Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
FIELD, H. What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, v. 83, n. 1, p. 251-268, 2009.
FOLEY, R. The Epistemology of Belief and the Epistemology of Degrees of Belief. American Philosophical Quarterly, v. 29, n. 2, p. 111–124, 1992.
FOLEY, R. Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and The Lockean Thesis. IN: HUBER, F.; SCHMIDT-PETRI, C. (Eds.). Synthese Library 342, Degrees of Belief. Dordrecht: Synthese, 2009, p. 37-47.
HARMAN, G. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
MACFARLANE, J. G. What Does it Mean to Say that Logic is Formal? PhD Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2000.
MAKINSON, D. C. The Paradox of the Preface, Analysis, v. 25, n. 6, p. 205–207, 1965.
PETTIGREW, R. Accuracy and the Credence-Belief Connection. Philosophers’ Imprint, v. 15, n. 16, p. 1-20, 2015.
PRIEST, G. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
PRIOR, A. N. Objects of Thought. The Philosophical Quarterly, v. 22, n. 87, p. 174-175, 1971.
SAINSBURY, R. M. Paradoxes. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
STEINBERGER, F. The Normative Status of Logic. IN: Zalta, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Último Acesso em: 13 de julho de 2018, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/logic-normative/>, 2017.
STEINBERGER, F. Explosion and the Normativity of Logic. Mind, v. 125, n. 498, p. 385-419, 2016.
WALLACE, R. J. Practical Reason. IN: Zalta, E. (Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Último Acesso em: 13 de julho de 2018, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/practical-reason/>, 2018.
WILDER, R. L. Introduction to the Foundations of Mathematics. New York: Wiley, 1952.
Downloads
Published
How to Cite
Issue
Section
License
Copyright
The submission of originals to Intuitio implies the transfer by the authors of the right for publication. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication. If the authors wish to include the same data into another publication, they must cite Intuitio as the site of original publication.
Creative Commons License
Except where otherwise specified, material published in this journal is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, which allows unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original publication is correctly cited.
