Virtue epistemology - Epistemologia da virtude
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2015.1.19738Keywords:
virtudes intelectuais, confiabilismo, externalismo, responsabilismo, crédito epistêmico, perspectivismoAbstract
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References
Goldman, A. I., 1992, “Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology,” in A. I. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Greco, J., 1999, “Agent Reliabilism,” in J. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives 13: Epistemology, Atascadero: Ridgeview.
Lackey, J., 2007, “Why we don’t deserve credit for everything we know,” Synthese, 158: 345–361.
Montmarquet, J., 1993, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Sosa, E., 1980, “The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 3–25. Reprinted in Sosa 1991.
Sosa, E., 1991, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zagzebski, L., 1996, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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