The husserliana notion of intentional conscience and its origins

Abstract

Through the investigation of the concept of intentional conscience it is intended to emphasize the specificity that circumscribes the region of the conscience in its phenomenological meaning. When analyzing the origins of such concept and the way as Husserl if appropriate and, consequently, reformulate it, at a first moment in the text of the Investigations and, later, in the Ideas, if it believes to be possible to delineate the proper movement of radicalization of his thought, in what it refers to the determination of the phenomenology as transcendental idealism. That is, one will be about the conscience notion longing for to present the way as the husserliana understanding of such notion determines and directs his own conception of phenomenology. Through this analysis, we believe to be able to demonstrate as the boarding adopted by Husserl with regard to the subject of the intentionality of the conscience finishes unchaining a clarification of the ontological presumptions present, in neutral way, in 1900, and in a philosophical position acknowledged idealistic transcendental in the Ideas, de 1913, and later works.