THE LIMITS OF TUGENDHAT’S ONTOLOGY

Abstract

This article aims to demonstrate the main thesis showed by Ernst Tugendhat along his Introductory Lessons to the Analytical Philosophy of Language. Therefore we shall follow the guideline of his propose, that means, that the formal Semantics must stay, after the linguistic turn in philosophy, the roll before played by the Ontology. We also shall give a special emphasis to the concepts through those Tugendhat articulates the most elementary ontological structure of all kind of perception. So we arrive at the concepts of space and time and his uses to the elementary propositions. Whereas we understand them, this will be the conceptual articulation that may bring to light the transcendental aspect of the Ontology as it is proposed at the Lessons. At last, our paper intends to expose some difficulties brought by the approximation between the transcendental and the categories of time and space, if these are not properly developed.