PERCEPTION AND IDEAS IN MALEBRANCHE

Abstract

Trying to identify the precise meaning of idea in the structure of the cartesian system, it was found an, at least apparent, ambiguity. The term ‘idea’ is employed to designate both the consciousness of an object and the object of consciousness. From that ambiguity a question arises: there is or there is not an univocity of the term ‘idea’ in Descartes (more specifically in Metaphysical Meditations). If the ambiguity prevails, the consistency of the cartesian argumentation would be harmed. This tension, by the way, is clearly reverberated in the dispute of twophilosophers influenced by Descartes. Arnauld, on one side, adopting the thesis that ideas are the consciousness of the object, and Malebranche, on the other, assuming that ideas are the object of consciousness. Hence, I believe that, by examining the positions of these two authors, it is possible in some way to clarify the nature of this tension. In this context, the argument for the necessity of ideas, that is the central goal of this text, has an essential importance. This argument propitiates the development of Malebranche’s thesis that ideas are immediate objects of perception, and, consequently, that the perception of corporeal entities is mediated by the perception of ideas; which are two constitutive elements of his representationalism. KEY WORDS: Malebranche. Idea. Perception