FROM HUME TO KANT: THE PURPOSES OF THE WILL AND THE FREE ACTION

Authors

  • André Luiz Olivier da Silva (UNISINOS) PUCRS/Brasil

Abstract

This article is about the purposes that the will undergoes to distinguish and to choose the good instead of evil, in accordance with Hume’s and Kant’s theories about the moral phenomenon. According to Hume, the action is subject to natural causes in such a manner that the will instigates the agent to do an act based on the sensation of pleasure and pain. Kant, instead, tries to break the natural causality, aiming to assure the agent’s autonomy, pointing the absolute categorical imperative as a condition to the freedom of action. While Hume emphasizes that the will is not capable to practice a free action, Kant advises that if we limit ourselves to empirical elements, action will obviously be deficient in moral value. KEY WORDS: Will. Freedom. Hume. Kant

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Published

2009-10-13

How to Cite

Olivier da Silva (UNISINOS), A. L. (2009). FROM HUME TO KANT: THE PURPOSES OF THE WILL AND THE FREE ACTION. Intuitio, 2(2), 54–60. Retrieved from https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/intuitio/article/view/5937

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 2 (2009)

Section

Articles

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