Two Senses of the Problem of the Will in the Second Wittgenstein

Authors

  • Eduardo Gomes de Siqueira (UFS) Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Sergipe

Abstract

This paper have as its aims two programmatic points: a) to show the way in wich the problem of the will is present in the horizon of the Philosophical Investigations in its two basic senses, as a philosophical pseudo-problem, and as an authentic grammatical problem; and b) to indicate the general perspective by wich a most precise delineation of a Grammatics of the Will in Wittgenstein can be done.

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Author Biography

Eduardo Gomes de Siqueira (UFS), Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal de Sergipe

Bacharel e Mestre em Filosofia (Fenomenologia) pela UFRJ (1996); Doutor em Filosofia da Linguagem pela Unicamp (2004); professor do DFL/UFS desde 1996, membro dos grupos de pesquisa em Conhecimento e Ciência (GE2C), em Filosofia da Religião (GPCR) e em Filosofia e Literatura (GeFeLit), com ênfase na abordagem wittgensteiniana terapêutico-gramatical de problemas conceituais.

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Published

2009-06-20

How to Cite

de Siqueira (UFS), E. G. (2009). Two Senses of the Problem of the Will in the Second Wittgenstein. Intuitio, 2(1), 3–22. Retrieved from https://revistaseletronicas.pucrs.br/intuitio/article/view/5060

Issue

Vol. 2 No. 1 (2009)

Section

Invited Authors

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