Restoring the Fallibilist Defeasibility Approach to Knowledge from Falsehood
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2021.1.40517Keywords:
Knowledge from falsehood, Epistemic defeat, Inferential knowledgeAbstract
The aim of this essay is to respond to two objections which can be made against the fallibilist defeasibility approach to inferential knowledge from falsehood (KFF). The first objection is that the absence of restorers reveals the explanatory incompleteness of the theory with regard to KFF, while the second one is that the thought experiment aimed at explaining KFF violates the Truth-Resistance Principle* (TR*) — the core thesis of Fallibilist Defeasibility Theory. In order to pursue the goals of this essay, I explain what the knowledge from falsehood debate is about; Secondly, I explain the fallibilist defeasibility approach developed by de Almeida (2017) to deal with KFF. Finally, I set the arguments up which can be brought against the fallibilist defeasibility approach and explain why they do not work.
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