Justifiers outside our heads
Epistemic internalism and the extended mind thesis
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2021.1.39445Keywords:
The extended mind, Epistemic Internalism, Contemporary Epistemology, Philosophy of mind, Extended EpistemologyAbstract
This article is about the compatibility between a form of epistemic internalism and a form of externalism about the mental called active externalism, expressed by the extended mind thesis. Internalism about epistemic justification is the thesis that such justification depends exclusively on internal factors. Active externalism is the position according to which it is possible that some of our mental states are external, namely, constituted in part by elements that are “outside our head”. Some philosophers believe the extended mind thesis is incompatible with accessibilist internalism because of the justifying role introspection has for internalists. I argue that, in spite of initial impressions, the extended mind thesis is compatible with epistemic internalism. The text has the following structure: (i) I present the extended mind thesis and Clark and Chalmers’s parity argument for it; (ii) I display epistemic internalism, specially in its accessibilist form; (iii) I lay out and evaluate arguments in favor of the incompatibility thesis regarding the extended mind thesis and accessibilist internalism.
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