Teoria de Utilidade Epistêmica e o Argumento da Acurácia a favor do Probabilismo
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2017.1.25490Keywords:
Acurácia, Bayesianismo, Graus de Crença, Probabilismo, Utilidade Epistêmica.Abstract
Diferente dos argumentos tradicionais na literatura em epistemologia formal, o argumento da acurácia gradacional de James Joyce fornece uma justificação epistêmica do probabilismo. O seu argumento pretende mostrar que funções probabilísticas de graus de crença têm maior grau de acurácia, ou menor grau de inacurácia, do que qualquer outra função não probabilística de crença gradual. Neste artigo, reconstruímos e examinamos a sua proposta, que é definida como uma estratégia de utilidade epistêmica. Também fornecemos uma aplicação de uma determinada medida de inacurácia (Brier score) sobre diferentes funções de crença gradual. Por fim, discutimos alguns problemas que foram levantados contra a versão original do argumento de Joyce e concluímos com algumas sugestões de resposta a esses problemas.
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