O que é agência epistêmica, afinal?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28442Palabras clave:
Agência, Racionalidade Epistêmica, Racionalidade Prática, Conhecimento.Resumen
Neste artigo examino a possibilidade de agência no domínio epistêmico – a visão compartilhada por muitos filósofos de que possamos ser ativos, ao invés de passivos, em relação às nossas crenças e manifestações de conhecimento. Concluo que a noção de agência epistêmica é plausível apenas em sentido indireto, referindo-se as diferentes ações que realizamos com intuito de melhorar nossos compromissos epistêmicos. Trata-se de um tipo de agência prática, como qualquer agência, mas que não nos autoriza a pensar que possamos estar agindo de alguma maneira quando cremos ou conhecemos.
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