Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42186Keywords:
Ampliative inference, Disjunctivism, Phenomenal dogmatism, Skepticism, TransmissionAbstract
The evidential role of experience in justifying beliefs has been at the center of debate in philosophy in recent years. One view is that experience, or seeming, can confer immediate (defeasible) justification on belief in virtue of its representational phenomenology. Call this view “representational dogmatism.” Another view is that experience confers immediate justification on belief in virtue of its relational phenomenology. Call this view “relational dogmatism.” The goal of this paper is to pit these two versions of dogmatism against each other in terms of their ability to account for ampliative, or non-deductive, inferential justification. I will argue that only the representational view can provide a plausible account of this type of justification.
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