O papel das inclinações na filosofia moral de Kant

Abstract

Kant’s moral philosophy can be criticized on the basis of the allegation that, requiring an austere disposition for attending to moral obligations, does not leave any room for inclinations. The focus of that reading is found in Groundwork I in which Kant refers to the charitable act of an insensible philanthropist. This passage seems to support the interpretation that morality in Kant requires the suppression of inclinations for an action to have moral value. Hence Schiller’s wellknown criticism of Kant’s rigorism. Kant is in part responsible for such misunderstandings. However, it is possible to defend Kantian moral philosophy, on the basis of the premise that inclinations do not withdraw the moral value of an action. Kant’s morality only requires that the determining ground of actions cannot be inclinations, which is different from the suppression of inclinations. Indeed, that pretension would contradict the finite nature of man, and is not required by Kant’s moral philosophy. KEY WORDS – Duty. Inclination. Kant. Moral value. Rigorism.