The scientific community as a collective epistemic subject
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2019.3.32106Keywords:
Collective epistemology. Collective epistemic subject. Collective knowledge. Joint commitment.Abstract
In collective epistemology it is argued that groups can be epistemic
subjects. That is, groups can instance doxastic attitudes (such as beliefs)
that can be evaluated as rational, justified or even cases of knowledge.
Collective epistemologists have held that broad groups such as the scientific community as can also be epistemic subjects. But it is not obvious that the scientific community is capable of doxastic attitudes even if the argument supporting the thesis that groups have such attitudes is sound. This, because the thesis that groups can be epistemic subjects depends on a notion of joint commitment that the scientific community seems to be unable to perform. Following this line of reasoning it is objected that the scientific community is not capable of doxastic attitudes. Given these objections the scientific community could not be treated as an epistemic subject. My purpose in this paper is to respond to these objections and to argue that the scientific community can be an epistemic subject.
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