Intellectual vices and social media: does constant access to information make us intellectually vicious?

Authors

  • Felipe Rocha L. Santos Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28299

Keywords:

Social Epistemology, Vice Epistemology, Virtue Epistemology, Testimony, Intellectual Vices

Abstract

Many call the era in which we currently live as the Information Age. This is because we live in a highly connected world where the flow of information is constant. One of the main sources of information these days is the Internet, whether through Google searches or through the testimony of our friends or companies that we trust on social media. This article aims at an analysis from the point of view of social epistemology and vice epistemology to answer a question that has been asked in several researches of experimental psychology: Does the use of the Internet make us intellectually vicious? My conclusion is that in certain contexts the use of the Internet makes us intellectually vicious. To reach this conclusion, I analyze an experiment conducted in an experimental psychology research that states that the Internet makes us intellectually arrogant and a response from a point of view of epistemology that argues that it may actually promote more virtues. Then I consider the architecture of the Internet within a specific informational context to be able to reach the conclusion that the internet, in certain contexts, makes us rather intellectually vicious.

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Published

2017-12-28

How to Cite

Santos, F. R. L. (2017). Intellectual vices and social media: does constant access to information make us intellectually vicious?. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 62(3), 657–682. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28299

Issue

Vol. 62 No. 3 (2017): Dossier: Epistemology

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