Group Knowledge of Epistemically Responsible Agents

Authors

  • Eleonora Cresto Universidad de Buenos Aires

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24269

Keywords:

Common Knowledge. Distributed Knowledge. Logic of Public Announcements. Epistemic Responsibility.

Abstract

This paper examines the concept of group knowledge. I start by noticing that we often seem compelled to attribute epistemic attitudes to groups, even when those attitudes differ from the ones held by their individual members. However, it is also the case that ideally responsible agents are subjected to a ‘deflationary pressure’ to ground those attitudes in concrete individuals. In the light of this, I argue that epistemically responsible groups should be conceived of as dynamic entities. Correlatively, group knowledge can be defined in terms of a family of possible paths between distributed and common knowledge. Finally I show that the Logic of Public Announcements can be used in this context as adequate tool to monitor the satisfaction of normative requirements by epistemically responsible individuals.

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References

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Published

2016-06-10

How to Cite

Cresto, E. (2016). Group Knowledge of Epistemically Responsible Agents. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 60(3), 460–482. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24269

Issue

Vol. 60 No. 3 (2015): Debating Contemporary Epistemology

Section

Debating Contemporary Epistemology

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