The antinomies metaethical between the blind and not-blind and the problem of moral realism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2016.1.20434Keywords:
Moral Realism. Antinomies Metaethical. Non-Cognitivism. Pragmatic Moral Cognitivism.Abstract
This article presents the pragmatic moral cognitivism as a way to overcome the classical antinomies between blind and nonblind and the (im)possibility of mental representation of the moral content. This position is sustained from the reconstruction of the metaethical debate triggered between cognitivists and non cognitivists, especially in the interpretations provided by McDowell’s moral realism and Blackburn’s quasi- realism. Therefore, the common assumption between these two meta-ethical theories [cognitivism and non-cognitivism] intends to be defeated by the pragmatic cognitivism, as their false dichotomies run throughout the thesis that moral knowledge is propositional. To solve this paradox, we avoid a radical dichotomy between facts and values, that is, there are no actions that can be valued extrinsically to the context of its use.
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