An Aristotelian Solution to the Liar Paradox in Metaphysics IV, 8
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https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2013.3.13156Keywords:
Aristotle. Liar paradox. Metaphysics, Book IV, Chapter 8.Abstract
It is commonly accepted nowadays that Aristotle would not have faced or seriously tried to solve the famous paradox of the Liar, although it has been formulated by Eubulides of Miletus, a member of the Megarian school and philosophical rival of Aristotle. At most, so says the traditional view, he just seems to make a mention of this paradox in Sophistical refutations, Chapter 25, perhaps outlining their solution. My intent in this article is to challenge this general view showing the Stagirite provides an implicit explanation for two versions of the Liar paradox, namely the self-referential version (which can be presented by the statement “this statement is false”) and anaphoric version (which can be presented by means of two mutually related statements: “the next statement is true” and “the previous statement is false”). My claim is that the Aristotelian solution to these two versions of the paradox lies at the core of his refutation of two theses, which I called as synalethia thesis (which holds that every statement is true) and as sympseudia thesis (which holds that every statement is false). Such a refutation is performed on the eighth chapter of the fourth book of Metaphysics, a text hitherto underestimated by modern interpreters, even though the final part of one of the most important writings of Aristotle. Aristotle’s solution, so I contend, is carried out through the following principles: (i) any statement is always preceded by a truth operator of the form ‘it is true that...’, i. e. every statement, whatever else it can declare, primarily asserts its own truth, and in accordance with the above principle (ii) any statement that asserts its own falsity or entails the truth of its contradictory is necessarily false. Through these principles, Aristotle’s refutation of synalethia and sympseudia is successful. I shall show that we obtain a good solution to the versions of the Liar mentioned above (and implicitly present in positions refuted), just applying those same principles to them. This type of solution to the Liar as well as for the theses mentioned before is very similar to that found explicitly in the works of many philosophers, namely William of Sherwood, Thomas Bradwardine, John Buridan, Albert of Saxony, Paulus Venetus, Charles S. Peirce and Arthur Prior. So I also argue that this lineage has its roots in Aristotle’s solution.Downloads
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