Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs

Authors

  • Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal Universidade de Brasília

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2012.2.11923

Keywords:

Plantinga. Bayesianism. Induction. Cumulative case.Dwindling probability. Swinburne.

Abstract

This article intends to show that Plantinga’s criticism against Bayesianism as an account of what is involved in rationality does not apply to all forms of Bayesianism. Swinburne’s version, based on a logical theory of probability, is an example of Bayesianism not hit by Plantinga’s criticism. In addition, the article argues that the problem of dwindling probabilities – pointed out by Plantinga in Warranted Christian Belief (2000) – vanishes in a Bayesian approach. So, even if it is not a sufficient account of rationality, Bayesianism helps to understand important elements of inductive reasoning, especially those relative to cumulative cases.

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Author Biography

Agnaldo Cuoco Portugal, Universidade de Brasília

Professor do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de Brasília, Doutor em Filosofia da Religião pelo King’s College da Universidade de Londres. Endereço Postal: UnB Colina, Bloco E – Ap. 201, Asa Norte, 70904-105 Brasília-DF.

Published

2012-08-30

How to Cite

Portugal, A. C. (2012). Plantinga and the Bayesian justification of beliefs. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 57(2), 15–25. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2012.2.11923

Issue

Section

Epistemology, Logic, and Philosophy of Language