Dogmatismo e Inferência Ampliativa

Palavras-chave: Inferência ampliativa, Disjuntivismo, Dogmatismo fenomenal, Ceticismo, Transmissão

Resumo

O papel evidencial da experiência na justificação de crenças tem estado no centro dos debates filosóficos nos últimos anos. Uma concepção é que a experiência, ou a aparência, pode conferir justificação imediata (revocável) à crença em virtude de sua fenomenologia representacional. Chame essa proposta de “dogmatismo representacional”. Outra concepção é que a experiência confere justificação imediata à crença em virtude de sua fenomenologia relacional. Chame essa proposta de “dogmatismo relacional”. O objetivo deste artigo é contrastar essas duas versões de dogmatismo em termos de sua capacidade de explicar a justificação inferencial ampliativa ou não dedutiva. Argumentarei que apenas a concepção representacional pode fornecer uma explicação plausível desse tipo de justificativa.

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Biografia do Autor

Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA.

Professor and Cooper Fellow, University of Miami.

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Publicado
2021-12-27
Como Citar
Brogaard, B. (2021). Dogmatismo e Inferência Ampliativa. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 66(1), e42186. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.42186
Seção
Epistemologia & Filosofia da Linguagem