Dogmatismo e Inferência Ampliativa
Resumo
O papel evidencial da experiência na justificação de crenças tem estado no centro dos debates filosóficos nos últimos anos. Uma concepção é que a experiência, ou a aparência, pode conferir justificação imediata (revocável) à crença em virtude de sua fenomenologia representacional. Chame essa proposta de “dogmatismo representacional”. Outra concepção é que a experiência confere justificação imediata à crença em virtude de sua fenomenologia relacional. Chame essa proposta de “dogmatismo relacional”. O objetivo deste artigo é contrastar essas duas versões de dogmatismo em termos de sua capacidade de explicar a justificação inferencial ampliativa ou não dedutiva. Argumentarei que apenas a concepção representacional pode fornecer uma explicação plausível desse tipo de justificativa.
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