What is epistemic agency, after all?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.28442Keywords:
Agency, Epistemic Rationality, Practical Rationality, Knowledge.Abstract
In this paper, I examine the possibility of agency in the epistemic domain – the view shared by many philosophers that we can be active, rather than passive, in relation to our beliefs and knowledge. I conclude that the notion of epistemic agency is plausible only in an indirect sense, referring to the different actions we take to improve our epistemic commitments. It is a kind of practical agency, like any agency, which does not allow us to think that we can be acting in any way when we believe or know.Downloads
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