Infinitism and Inferential Externalism

Authors

  • Tito Flores Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, PUCRS

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24286

Keywords:

Infinitism. Externalism. Internalism. Epistemic Justification. Skepticism.

Abstract

The purpose of this essay is to show that the version of epistemological infinitism defended by Peter Klein is externalistic in character. I present the most important questions infinitism is supposed to resolve and also present the fundamental difference regarding internalism and externalism in epistemology. I conclude with an indication of what would be the best way to understand infinitism and how to evade the problems that emerge from Klein’s externalist infinitism.

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Published

2016-06-13

How to Cite

Flores, T. (2016). Infinitism and Inferential Externalism. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 60(3), 566–578. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2015.3.24286

Issue

Vol. 60 No. 3 (2015): Debating Contemporary Epistemology

Section

Debating Contemporary Epistemology

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