Self-consciousness vs. self-knowledge in Kant
A discussion with empirical evidences
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2022.1.43691Keywords:
Kant, self-awareness, self-knowledge, selfAbstract
This paper intends to briefly analyze the difference between self-awareness and self-knowledge in Kant and will try to present empirical evidence for this division, especially from the proposal of Klein (2012). For this, the primary source of research will be the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). This work has the following structure: first, what led Kant to address the issue of self-consciousness will be briefly presented; then, the difference between self-awareness and self-knowledge in CRP will be discussed considering this discussion among current commentators as well; finally, some empirical evidence of this separation will be presented based on Klein’s (2012) arguments and these will be discussed based on the idealist proposal of the German philosopher.
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