Considerations on determinism and freedom based on Harry Frankfurt’s theory

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2022.1.43563

Keywords:

determinism, freedom, Harry Frankfurt, free will, moral responsibility

Abstract

This article aims to demonstrate how it is possible for determinism and free will to be compatible. We will do this firstly by exposing the traditional concept of determinism, demonstrating that its common rejection stems from a misunderstanding of its meaning. Then, we will present Harry Frankfurt’s theory of freedom, arguing that it explains in a meaningful way how the actions of each individual can be said free within a deterministic view. Finally, we will conclude the article with brief notes on moral responsibility; we suggest that moral responsibility is a well-justified practice within any description of the world – be it strong libertarian, compatibilist, or determinist. 

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Author Biography

Camila Pilotto Figueiredo, Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPel), Pelotas, RS, Brasil.

Mestra e licenciada em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Pelotas (UFPel), em Pelotas, RS, Brasil. Doutoranda no Programa de Pós-graduação em Letras na mesma instituição. Professora no curso de Licenciatura em Filosofia a distância (UAB) da UFPel.

References

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Published

2022-12-22

How to Cite

Figueiredo, C. P. (2022). Considerations on determinism and freedom based on Harry Frankfurt’s theory. Intuitio, 15(1), e43563. https://doi.org/10.15448/1983-4012.2022.1.43563

Issue

Vol. 15 No. 1 (2022): Single volume

Section

Epistemologia e Metafísica

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