A schutzian approach to the problem of equality-inequality

Abstract

“Equality” is one of the most prevailing value in modern society. It is almost taken for granted that equality has to be guaranteed, advanced, and achieved in any sphere. As such, the idea of equality continues to be one of the basic principles of modern social theory since J. J. Rousseau discussed it. Equality is, however, not a definitive but a “sensitizing” (H. Blumer) and “empty” concept, i.e., it might take on various connotations. Many scholars interested in the problem of equality-inequality as a social phenomenon therefore have made efforts to fulfill it with some contents. Their discussions tend to adjust their focuses on “Equality of What?” (A. Sen), examine various types of equality, and draw a conclusion on which type of equality has to be given higher priority over others, founded on some basic assumptions taken for granted. One assigns higher priority, for example, to “equality of resource,” another to “equality of capability,” a third to “equal opportunity to the welfare,” and a forth to “equal access to the advantage,” and then there is no way to reconcile to each other. Empirical researches led by such discussions might accumulate many data and findings in quantity, but could not develop an adequate theory of equality-inequality, and could not also deepen understanding of the social phenomenon of equality-inequality. In this respect, we had better, I think, consult Schutz’s contribution to the Fifteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion held at Columbia University in 1955. This essay aims to examine the significance of Schutz’s phenomenologically oriented discussion about equality to the inquiry into a problem of equality-inequality in particular, and the significance of his phenomenologically oriented social theory in general.