The resurrection of Injunctive the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court:

Abstract

This article is to examine the central scope of the current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the writ of injunction, especially with regard to the effects of concessional decision of the writ in the face of the principle of separation of powers, especially in the light of the new hermeneutic constitutional. The relevance of the issue looms large given that the theory of unconstitutional omissions – especially the control of constitutionality of omission – is to question whose scientific approach is quite novedia in our legal community, because it was only contemplated in the Brazilian with the advent of 1988 Federal Constitution, which established the writ of injunction and direct action of unconstitutionality by omission as instruments aimed at combating the so-called syndrome of constitutional ineffectiveness, which always followed the constitutional moment because of serious problem that affects the constitutional law homeland since days of yore: the inertia constant of the legislature to regulate the common rights enshrined in constitutional provisions stripped of self-applicability. In the north, one sees that the focal point of controversy in the writ of injunction concerns precisely the principle of separation of powers and its legal and constitutional developments, as some scholars to the Supreme Court in its recent jurisprudence on the subject would be violating the clause by supplying stony immediately the legal vacuum left by the Legislature and implement the right carecedor of regulations, with erga omnes effect even possible encroachment on the exclusive competence of the legislative body. It was, therefore, through this study, check for actual harm to the separation of powers in the current jurisprudence of the Supreme on the effects of the writ of injunction or any other collision of constitutional principles which it results.