Instituições deliberadas ou espontâneas?
Abstract
O artigo discute se é razoável admitir que boas instituições sociais possam emergir muitas vezes de processos espontâneos e cegos de seleção evolutiva. Para examinar a lógica que sustenta essa tese, é construído um jogo evolucionário, cuja solução vem a ser a emergência eventual de uma convenção coordenadora. Nesse jogo populacional e descentralizado, os agentes individuais participam de jogos de coordenação bilaterais, procurando otimizar localmente. O modelo resultante, do ponto de vista matemático, vem a ser espacialmente dinâmico e estocástico. Por isso, as evoluções possíveis do modelo são estudadas por simulação. Também são feitas considerações de ordem metodológica sobre o funcionalismo na interpretação dos resultados. O artigo sustenta uma tese contrária à idéia de ordem espontânea.
Palavras-chave: Ordem espontânea. Instituições deliberadas. Jogo evolucionário. Jogo de coordenação. Modelo dinâmico estocástico. Funcionalismo.
Abstract
The paper deals with the following question: is it reasonable to accept that many good social institutions emerge in a spontaneous way by means of blind evolutionary selection processes? In order to examine the logic that support this thesis, an evolutionary game is constructed that requires the eventual emergence of a coordinating convention as a solution. In this population and decentralized game, agents play coordination bilateral games, looking for local optimization. The constructed model, from a mathematical point of view, is a stochastic and spatial dynamic model. In consequence, the possible model evolutions are studied by means of simulations. Methodological considerations about functionalism are done in the interpretation of the results. The papers support a thesis against the idea of a spontaneous order.
Key words: Spontaneous order. Institutions by design. Evolutionary game. Coordination game. Dynamic and stochastic model. Functionalism.
JEL Classification: D02 – Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations. P11 – Planning, Coordination, and Reform.
Downloads
Published
Issue
Section
License
COPYRIGHT
The submission of originals to Análise implies the transfer by the authors of the right for publication. Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication. If the authors wish to include the same data into another publication, they must cite Análise as the site of original publication.
CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSE
As this journal is open access, the articles are allowed free use in scientific and educational applications, with citation of the source.
According to the type of Creative Commons License (CC-BY 4.0) adopted by Análise, the user must respect the requirements below.
You are free to:
Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
However, only under the following terms:
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests Análise endorses you or your use.
No additional restrictions — You may not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Notices:
You do not have to comply with the license for elements of the material in the public domain or where your use is permitted by an applicable exception or limitation.
No warranties are given. The license may not give you all of the permissions necessary for your intended use. For example, other rights such as publicity, privacy, or moral rights may limit how you use the material.
For more details on the Creative Commons license, please follow the link in the footer of this website.
