

# WORLDLINESS IN HUSSERL'S LATE MANUSCRIPTS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF TIME

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**SÍNTESE** – Os chamados manuscritos C, recentemente publicados, têm um interesse especial para a clarificação da constituição do mundo na medida em que mostram como, a partir de um mundo primordial ou quasi-mundo correlato à pré-intencionalidade, se atinge o mundo plenamente intersubjetivo constituído por uma intencionalidade de interesses desde uma práxis comunicativa. Seguindo os manuscritos, este artigo tem um propósito quádruplo: 1) tentar discernir diferentes caracterizações do mundo como horizonte universal, representação-mundo, todo, forma, idéia e fundamento; mostra-se, assim, o papel da temporalidade na raiz desses traços de mundanidade; 2) níveis de constituição do mundo são desvelados a fim de diferenciar um fundamento previamente dado de um fundamento que se desenvolve através dos estágios do mundo egóico, mundo da casa, mundo da vida e mundo-em-si; desvela-se aqui um encaixamento desses horizontes um no outro; 3) uma análise posterior dos níveis é dada através do questionamento retroativo na primalidade (*Urtümlichkeit*) como um retrocesso que revela o desenvolvimento de um pré-mundo a um mundo genuíno; uma gênese permanente, antes de uma gênese do passado, é realçada; 4) finalmente, mostrar-se-á como antecipações da fenomenologia pós-husserliana nos remetem a uma abertura originária do mundo em sua mundanidade, um âmbito que é anterior à manifestação de um mundo de objetos e uma ordem de manifestação diferente daquela do mundo.

**PALAVRAS-CHAVE** – Fenomenologia genética. Husserl. Manuscritos C. Mundo. Temporalidade.

**ABSTRACT** – The recently published C-manuscripts hold special interest for the clarification of the constitution of the world by showing how, starting from a primal or quasi-world correlated with preintentionality, it advances to the full intersubjective world constituted by an intentionality of interests within communicative praxis. Following the manuscripts, this paper has a fourfold purpose. First, it attempts to discern different characterizations of the world as universal horizon, world-representation, whole, form, idea, and ground. The role of temporality at the roots of these traits of worldliness is shown. Second, levels of constitution of the world are disclosed in order to differentiate a ready-made ground from a ground that develops through the stages of egoical world, homeworld, lifeworld, and world-in-itself. An encasement of these horizons one-in another is displayed. Third, a further analysis of levels is given through the inquiry back into primality (*Urtümlichkeit*) as a retrogression that reveals the development from a pre-world to a genuine world. A permanent genesis rather than a past genesis is brought out. Finally, anticipations will be shown of post-Husserlian phenomenological views regarding an originary openness of the world in its worldliness, a realm that is prior to the manifestation of a world of objects, and a different order of manifestation than that of the world.

**KEY WORDS** – Genetic phenomenology. Husserl. C-manuscripts . World. Temporality.

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## 1 World-characterizations

The C-manuscripts<sup>1</sup> afford valuable contributions to Husserl's six characterizations of the world. They can be grouped into three pairs that depend on a distinctive trait of the world, and are variously related to the temporal structure of horizonedness.

The first pair turns on uniqueness (*Einzigkeit*), and concerns the world as *universal horizon* and its thematization in a *world-representation*. The unfolding of horizons goes hand in hand with the disclosure of a world that is permanently subject to modification and nevertheless remains at the same time as a unique world in a nonthematic manner throughout the experience of objects. Husserl describes an interpenetration and togetherness of horizons, and a reference from preceding horizons to subsequent horizons. If the references pertaining to outer horizons are followed, and an advance is made to further and further horizons, the world as universal horizon will be finally disclosed. This nexus of references means that the experience of the world can only take place as a "final accomplishment" (*Endleistung*) after a series of previous steps: "This accomplishment, brought about under the title world-experience–transcendental world-experience–*implies in concealment* a sequence of levels, on which the total accomplishment (*Totalleistung*) (the one through which the world is 'for me') is grounded, i.e., that must necessarily be performed, so that this end-performance is achieved." (4 f.)

Thus, in the process of making the world manifest, a sequence of levels and a final performance can be disclosed. Calling attention to the mediation of objects and the sequence of levels, Husserl can claim that the world is "the universal object (*Gegenstand*) of an universally extended and extensible experience".<sup>2</sup> Or, bringing the immediacy of a final accomplishment into focus, he can also assert that the world "does not exist as an entity, as an object (*Objekt*), [...]"<sup>3</sup> Both claims concern the world as universal horizon. Another viewpoint is that of a thematic apprehension by means of an objectifying identification. This amounts to the construction, with the varying resources afforded by the surrounding world, of a world-representation (*Weltvorstellung*) as a primal configuration for our knowledge of the world. According to Husserl, the relationship between world-representations and the world as a universal horizon is similar to the relationship between the profiles of an object and the object itself. As "'manners of appearance' of the unique world,"<sup>4</sup> world-representations are based on the experience of particular objects of surrounding worlds and their horizons, although they are not limited in their range and scope to the more immediate conditions. In other words,

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<sup>1</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934). Die C Manuskripte*, *Husserliana – Materialien* VIII (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). Numbers of pages in the text refer to this volume.

<sup>2</sup> Hua IX, 95. Abbr., with indication of volume and page, for Edmund Husserl, *Husserliana – Gesamelte Werke*, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1950 ff.; Dordrecht / Boston / London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1987 ff.; Dordrecht, Springer, 2004 ff.

<sup>3</sup> Hua VI, 146.

<sup>4</sup> Hua XV, 178 (Ms. C 11).

the lifeworld that functions as a ground renders possible alternative pathways leading to different world-representations according to the various interests and goals encompassed by it: “The world conscious in the manner in which at a time multiplicities within it are conscious in particular manners of consciousness; I am affected as conscious in a particular way by these multiplicities” (363). An example is afforded by the development of a child’s world-representation, and Husserl holds that “a world-representation means here the world valid already for the child [...], the surrounding world in which it lives, to which it lives, values, strives, looks at, and in which it is, in which the others are already as objects and to which the other subjects of the living-in, operating-in, of the being-occupied are as subjects, which in the togetherness, included the child, always constitute being anew, always share the world anew” (74).

The second pair of characterizations highlights the essential unity of the world and has to do with a *totality* connected by a *form*. Husserl refers to the experience of the world as a total experience, a total performance, a universal apperception or a universal intending. The world is conceived of as a “total horizon” (241) or as “the universe of what now exists for me, of what now exists for us” (403). It is the universe of what comes into being by its own without any help from us or is brought about by us through an immediate or mediate activity. In order to avoid the impression that the world is limited to a marginal horizon as the final term of explication, which might be suggested by the characterization as universal horizon, this new characterization stresses the enclosure of all objects and horizons that have been exceeded. Thus, the world encloses not only what has not been objectified and cannot be objectified, but also the sum total of objects encompassed within the universal horizon. This means that the inquiry must follow a twofold orientation directed both to the whole and to the world-form that explains why the whole has a unity. Time, space, and causality are structures in this universal form that stamp duration, extension and causal properties on objects: “Objective time is the form of objective becoming, of objective alteration, that holds all individual real beings as beings in becoming (as persisting beings) in a totality [...]. The world-totality of an objective time-phase (of a time-point) has the form space, it is the form of coexistence in a time-point. The universal presence of causality: causality <is> nothing other than the lack of independence of each temporal extent, of each-temporal point as limit of the temporal extent, [...]” (408). Causality entails a stronger mode of connection than a binding through spatiotemporality. This strict connection is not added subsequently to what exists in isolation, but rather shows that plurality precedes singularity within a relationship of belonging together by which the alteration of an object is the consequence of alterations in other objects. Thus, contrary to spatiotemporality, causality is not a “form of distribution”, but rather a “connecting form” that brings forth “a universal relatedness one-to-another in action and passion.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Hua IX, 68. See Hua XV, 337 ff. (Ms C 17).

The third pair of characterizations turns on the harmony of world-experience, and depicts the world as a *ground* that both results from past experiences and sustains present modalizations, and an *idea* that maintains future world-experience open. It is linked to the development and harmony of world-experience in time: “The actual being,” Husserl writes, “has as now-being a core of settled being (*erledigtes Sein*), of already actual being, of already actualized being, and its horizon of the coming-first-into-being, of the to-be-actualized or first-to-be-actualized” (403). With respect to the future, the world-horizon shows an open indeterminateness. As we unfold open horizons according to the *immer wieder* of explication, we become aware of the possibility of an unending process. The idea is concealed in our experience and is disclosed by a reflexive consciousness turned to the indefinitely repeated unfolding of the world. Reflection discovers an orientation toward the complete givenness of the world, and, on the basis of this direction to fullness, extrapolates the goal to which the process advances. As an infinite and unattainable pole, the idea is motivated by the harmonious fulfillment of all partial anticipations, and by the continuous increase in the grade of perfection toward a limit that cannot be intuitively given. Since the unravelling of intentional implications is not performed in an arbitrary manner, the notion of idea brings out a teleological movement in world-experience, which was only implicit in the characterizations as universal horizon and totality. Husserl speaks of the constitution “of a harmonious world, constantly adjusting itself, enriching itself, always predelineated as an idea, [...]” (373), and stresses the implications of the intersubjective character of this constitution: “The transcendence in which the world is constituted, consists in that it constitutes itself by means of the others and the generatively constituted co-subjectivity and because of that obtains its being-sense as an infinite world” (393).

As concerns our present world-experience, the world-horizon becomes a ground (*Boden*) in two senses. First, it is a ground in the sense of a nonobjective margin out of which objects can be made distinct and clarified. Second, the world-horizon sustains modalization because it renders possible the maintenance of the locus occupied by an object after the cancellation of its validity so that it may be filled up again with a new object. So, after the cancellation of an objective intention, another objective intention attains validity. Furthermore, the world is a ground not only in its present connection to any type of object, but also by its association with the past experience of particular types of objects. Along with world-experience as a flow of intentional acts in the actual moment, there is a sedimented world-possession, which has been characterized by Husserl as “a foundation (*Unterlage*), a ground for new acts, new sense-formations” (372). The world is now pregiven with a degree of familiarity that also contributes to the harmony of world-experience by organizing it according to play-spaces (*Spielräume*), i.e., a typicality that encloses all particular types. In contrast to this familiar ground that emerges as a precipitate of experience, the underlying-marginal ground can be seen as a primal ground (*Urboden*).

We see, then, that the world can be characterized as a horizon out of which manifold representations emerge by virtue of an openness to new possibilities that the present brings forth, as an all-encompassing unity on account of a form whose basic structure is temporality, as an idea because of an anticipation outlined for the future, as a primal ground owing to a abiding structure of the present, and as an acquired ground due to a possession that the past affords.

## 2 World-levels

Husserl refers to different levels in the constitution of the world in these terms: “Insofar as it appears that temporalization and time, and hence also existing objectivity, the existing world, have different levels, with regard to which, in each case in a particular sense of being as being-temporal, we can speak of a universe of being as ‘world,’ and of time itself, one must say: times, objects, worlds of every sense have finally their origin in the primal world of the living present, or, better in the transcendental primal-ego (*Ur-Ego*) that lives his primal life as primally flowing presentation and present, and so in its manner has being, being in its primal temporalization, which in the flow constitutes a primal time and <a> primal world (*Urwelt*)” (4). There are three key points to note in this passage. First, Husserl states that there are levels in the constitution of the world. Second, he holds that these levels also entail a different manifestation of objects and time. Third, he asserts that this articulation leads back to a primal world. Leaving the last point for the next section, I will first focus on the levels of constitution of the world according to the different types of phenomenological analysis.

A “regressive destratification” (*regressive Abschichtung*) and a “progressive bringing-into-play” (*progressives Ins-Spiel-Setzen*) (87) reveal a sequence of five levels that can be considered not only according to the dimensions of worldliness, temporality, and objectivity mentioned in the quoted passage, but also with regard to the dimensions of subjectivity, acts, and temporality.

In a first level of static analysis, the world can be depicted according to the three aforementioned pairs of characterizations, if we leave out of consideration the flowing character of the world as ground, i.e., we focus on it as the primal marginal-underlying basis or as a ready-made outcome. To this it must be added that the flow of time is envisaged as an impressional consciousness with its retentive and protentional horizons, acts as interpretations of an inert primary sensibility, intersubjectivity as tied to an experience grounded on the actual presence of the other’s body, objectivity as ready-made items taken as guiding clues for intentional analysis, and subjectivity as a pole for the irradiation of acts: “But all this (and such is the sense of this ‘static’ <phenomenology>,” writes Husserl, “before any question about a genesis, about a history of the becoming of the world in transcendental subjectivity and its here still unknown for us transcendental temporality” (5). The peculiarity of the other four levels is that successive steps in the becoming or development of the world are taken into consideration. Hence an analysis of world-levels is basically an analysis of the world as a pre-given ground.

A second level is that of genetic analysis. Husserl goes on to raise the “question about a genesis, about a history of the becoming of the world in the transcendental subjectivity and its here still unknown for us transcendental temporality” (5). Worldliness appears now as typicality encompassing manifold types. Habitualities on the noetic side, and, correlatively, empirical types on the noematic side, establish a system of intentions and orientations towards the world that make up as a whole the world that exists for each ego. From now on our theme is what Husserl calls “the world-possession of a horizonedness, whose mobility and sense is the great problem” (254). In turn, temporality is characterized by a determinate protentional orientation. This means that protentions are not merely opened to the future but also allow a predelineation of future experience because they are second-order intentions that reflect first-order retentions. Due to their motivation in genetic syntheses, protentions are anticipating intentions that depend on the style of previous experiences. Parallel to these modes of worldliness and temporality, objects are considered as substrates of typical determinations, acts as conditioned not only by affections but also by a secondary sensibility, i.e., by what the ego has acquired and maintains as an abiding possession, intersubjectivity as reduced to types according to habitual modes of behavior, and subjects as substrates of habitualities.

With regard to habitualities, Husserl refers to an instinctive intentionality that is previous to the acquisition of habitualities and amounts to an originary habituality: “The instinctive intentionality of the monads belongs to their worldly being and life, their satisfaction is directed to the world” (169). Husserl speaks of stages of development both in the sense that out of a single-celled being an animal monad emerges, and out of the animal monad a human monad emerges, and in the sense that there is a succession of ages that encompasses embryonic stages, childhood, adolescence, maturity, and old age: “And here we have the bio-psychically tendentious (*das biophysisch Tendenziöse*) in the typical becoming, the natural-historical style” (170). This process is reflected in the correlative constitution of the world: “The world itself has a childhood and grows up to a mature world, [...]” (74). Husserl speaks of a twofold habituality. On the one hand, there are habitualities directed to what already exists because they have been acquired and have become “settled interests” (*erledigte Interessen*) that amount to a permanent possession. On the other hand, there are the habitualities of the ends that guide our action, i.e., “genuine interests, those of the enduring plans, of the ends and systems of ends, vital ends, and of the particular possessions referred to them as means that are available and stand at the ready with the preferential awakenings, and of the living systems of ends, of the plans that guide personality” (75). Husserl states that the two sides of habituality are reflected in the articulation of horizons in a passage that highlights the distinction between the world as ground and universal horizon: “The concept of horizon splits up also. Horizon of the situation, a vital interest is stirred up, on which the momentary activities are supported, stirred up in another way is the whole world-horizon, insofar as the world is always there” (75).

With the nonegological genetic analysis a radical transformation takes place through the enlargement of egological transcendental subjectivity into intersubjectivity: “Naturally the world does not compose itself piece by piece out of the primordially reduced worlds. Every primordial sphere is the product of a reduction from an intersubjective and generatively constituted sense, the sense of being arises from the intersubjectively concordant experience of each one out of an experience that already has a sense-relation to intersubjectivity. My experience as experience of the world (and so each of my perceptions) includes not only others as world-objects, but also constantly (in co-validity with regard to being) as co-subjects, as co-constitutive, and both aspects are inseparably intertwined” (HM VIII, 394). The retrospective inquiry starting from the world-phenomenon leads now back to a transcendental intersubjectivity that is examined in the three levels of primal history, historicity as the full-fledged process of institution and reactivation of sense, and second historicity as the development of a rational community. Husserl states that “of course, world-constitution is not the affair of this single growing human being, but of the intersubjectivity of growing and already grown human beings, [...]” (75), and hence points to the “transcendental co-bearers (*Mit-träger*) of the world-phenomenon” (347) and “the building-up of the full world” (336).

In the level of primal history, the world appears as a homeworld built on the earth as what supports as from below all human activity. On this basis, Husserl can refer to a “surrounding world as homeworld” and to a “synthesis of homeworlds” (409). The surrounding world can be depicted as a more or less comprehensive environment, but it is always referred back to a home as the domain of family-life and the originary sphere of acting and enduring. This new view of the world leads to a complementation of the previous analyses of time both with a pre-egoical time grounded on instincts and a familial or generative time that emerges by virtue of a primary process of communalization. As regards the other dimensions of phenomenological analysis, acts follow the ends raised in the homeworld, objects are those typical to this limited environment, and subjects are homecomrades. Husserl stresses a generative nexus that is previous to historical traditions: “The finite ego in the concatenation of its generation, the infinity of generations. The primal tradition of procreation, the procreators transmitting their individual being in the procreated individual, tradition in the communalization of awoken individuals. What is proper to me, makes an impression on others. Overlapping of individuals, associative products of blending in the individuals and bearing-one-in-the-other (*Ineinandertragen*) of the proper and the alien. So in the pretraditional tradition. Bequeathal of the originary generative tradition and bequeathal of the customary tradition, historically” (437).

If we now turn to the level of history and its traditions, we see that the world is a “communicative surrounding world as the field of a communicative praxis” for a “communicative humanity” (398, 400). This new environment has as a distinctive character a typical acquaintedness with the world character valid for subjects that are the bearers of lasting and widespread ends: “If a human being has already a

horizon of humanity in historical development, and, expressed more clearly, already a world-consciousness through a history that discovers the development, then [...] the world-horizon receives a new predelineation of sense" (242). The world has the character of a historical and communitarian ground, which Husserl, although only very occasionally in the C-manuscripts, calls the lifeworld, and within it the temporal horizons of manifold subjects overlap with one another and bring forth the unity of historical time. As regards the other dimensions, intersubjectivity develops into a higher-order generativity overarching a wide spatio-temporal extent, acts become the reactivation of the communitarian acquisitions, subjectivity turns into the bearer of this bequeathed validity, and objects expand into cultural objects.

Finally, philosophy and science understand worldliness in the mode of the true world in itself in contrast to the various surrounding worlds. These environments, with their world-representations, appear as more or less unilateral apprehensions of the actual world conceived of as an idea to which we approximate. This means that a theoretical interest attempts to establish what the world really is in the midst of changing circumstances by disclosing identical characteristics that are not tied to them: "The real being (*das wirkliche Sein*) is an a priori norm, an idea, to which I approximate actively and freely, which I can occasionally miss, but with the apodictic certainty, that after all it exists as a limit, that it has its empty, to be produced actively and freely, harmonious and always more complete and approximating manners of givenness" (91). The temporal counterpart is the notion of intemporal formations that can be repeated in an identical manner, and provide the basis for the production of further higher-level formations, in a process that can be reiterated over and over again so that it becomes directed to infinite poles. Corresponding to these modes of temporality and worldliness, intersubjectivity shows itself as a rational community made up by subjects whose acts, by virtue of intending ideal and imperishable acts, appear within a horizon of infinite tasks as the "universal horizon of the possible developments of mature humanity—we rational human beings, we scientific human beings" (243). As Husserl writes in the following passage, we have the capacity to develop teleologically, but this is not inevitable: "Phenomenology can disclose a universal, absolute teleology, to which the necessary awakening of the teleological idea of human being in its conscious reference to a realm of absolute teleological harmony (realm of ends) <belongs>. But the absolute teleology is not a characteristic of the pregiven world as such, it is never something 'already existent,' it is not a necessary structural form, predelineated and admitting to be set apart in the already existent worldliness, as the form of an inductive future" (433 f.). Husserl goes on to observe that, therefore, one must differentiate the harmony of developments due to primal instincts in the sphere of primal passivity, to acquired habitualities, and to the invariable structures of transcendental subjectivity, and what he defines as "the development structure of the 'higher' humanity, the 'tendency' to the development (*Ausbildung*) of the norm-idea guiding the proper authentic ego, the idea of intersubjective authenticity, the correlative norm-idea of a beautiful world (*die korrelative Normidee einer schönen Welt*), in which one lives in freedom under the idea of freedom, co-responsible, co-shaping" (434).



The stratification goes hand to hand with an encasement of levels, to which Husserl refers in the following terms: “To the present as a living and flowing happening pertains an endless horizon, and a horizon that itself flows, and modifies its content in the flow, the future process of a continuity of processes, which are reiteratively encased one-in-another, [...]. If one considers the prede- lineated total horizon, the totally and reiteratively encased continuity, it is to be considered in itself as the unity of a process that modifies itself reiteratively and has its reiterated total horizon before itself as on the other hand after itself” (405). The encasement is characterized explicitly in temporal terms in the sense that a past present encloses within itself a further past, and so forth, but it is also analyzed by implication as an encasement of levels of horizonedness in which every partial level is encompassed by a wider level without losing its distinctive traits, although it does not remain unaffected by the intermingling of the more determinate strata. Along with the encasement within dimensions, there is also an overlapping or interpenetration of the dimensions as one moves forward through the levels in the direction of more determinateness.

The egoical world, the homeworld, the socio-historical world, and the world-in-itself do not exclude each other, but rather coexist in an encasement one-within-the other that does not make them indistinct. Husserl explicitly makes the point that the foundation-sequence by which we advance from the conditions of possibility of social integration, through life in society, to a rational community, does not entail a separate development: “For every deconstruction-reduction (*Abbau-Reduktion*) is valid the main principle that the deconstruction strata are not constituted in the genesis separately (*für sich*) in a genetic sequence that corresponds to the foundation-sequence. Of course, to each stratum there corresponds a stratum in the genesis; all the intentionality through which a pregiven world is constituted, is genetically acquired and is conceived in a genetical continual becoming. But all geneses of all strata operate together in the immanence of time (*fungieren immanent zeitlich zusammen*), they are coexisting geneses” (394).

### 3 A Depth Analysis of Levels: the Primal World

So far the levels of world-constitution have been considered according to increasing degrees of complexity brought about by the dimension of intersubjectivity. Husserl also advances a depth egological analysis in order to understand “the worldly concept of experience and the worldly concept of consciousness,” which is a consciousness of, as “that of a constitutive result” (335 n.). With this purpose he outlines a “system of tasks” (350) in which the process that leads to the world as a constitutive outcome is examined in a series of levels that emerge out of a life-stream (*Lebensstrom*) or stream of lived-experiences (*Erlebnisstrom*). The constitution of the world is disclosed through a deconstruction that advances toward a primal hyle (*Ur-Hyle*) as a “core alien to the ego” (*ichfremder Kern*) in the living present (110). The world-apperception and the sequence of levels leading to it are bracketed in order attain a nonapperceptive sphere in the sense that it is nothing

more than a hyletic core that functions as a material for the presentative function of consciousness. Each life-stream has an ego-pole (*Ich-Pol*) as a pole of unity that goes through it. This means that an identical ego with its rays of affection and action is a constant stratum in the life-stream, whereas the hyle makes up the opposite “side of what is other than the ego’s own” (*Seite des Ichfremden*). Thus the life-stream is two-sided: “Every lived-experience, and now in a more concrete manner a two-sided one, has an ego-side and a nonegoic-side, which is alien to the ego (*ichfremde*), or each unity has a double stratum, a stratum of the stimulus (*Reiz*) or of the guidepoint (‘form’) and that of the what (*was*) of this form, of the unity, that exercises the stimulus there or is the that toward-which (*Woraufhin*) of the directedness” (189). On the basis of this life-stream and its two sides we must show the order of the constitutive building-up of the world. But both sides are still indistinguishable in content, for all their difference in function. As Husserl puts it: “The constitution of beings of different levels, of worlds, of times, has two primal presuppositions, two primal sources (*Urquellen*) that [...] always ‘underlie’ it: 1) my primal ego as operating, as primal ego in its affections and actions, with all its essential formations in accompanying modes, 2) my primal nonego, as a primal stream of temporalization and itself as a primal form of temporalization, constituting a time-field, that of primal materiality (*Ur-Sachlichkeit*). But both primal grounds (*Urgründe*) are united, inseparable and so abstract when considered by themselves” (199).

Husserl inquires into a primal level (*Urstufe*) prior to any kind of apperceptive constitution and refers it, on the side of the ego, to a primal kinaesthesia (*Urkinaesthese*) directed in an undifferentiated manner to an also undifferentiated primal hyle (*Urhyle*) that fills the whole life-stream. Kinaesthesia are egoical events that Husserl characterizes both as nonvoluntary events and as passive events of will because will can hold sway over them (see 336). When he describes them as nonvoluntary events, Husserl refers to “the instinct that has its effect on the kinaesthesia” (328), and speaks of an “instinctive drive of objectivation – nature” (331), which leads eventually to the constitution of a “unique world” (*einzig Welt*), of which nature is the “primal core” (*Urkern*) (336). There is a “guidance of primal instincts” in the “primal constitutive building-up of the world in its being-regions” (318). Husserl considers this primal kinaesthesia in the pre-ego in terms of an interpenetration (*Durcheinander*) of different partial types of kinaesthesia, and stresses that the relationship between kinaesthetical pre-egoical directedness and undifferentiated hyle continuously changes. So we have “a uniform, aimless ‘doing’ at one with an nonseparated totality of the hyle (*mit einer ungeschiedenen Totalität der Hyle*)” (113). The subjective side of the life-stream must be taken into consideration not only through kinaesthesia but also “as feeling, as mood, as a universal horizontal ‘life-feeling’ (*Lebensgefühl*)” (362), which will condition the way in which the ego has to do with what is alien to it. This is the level of a passive primal intentionality that, in spite of its passivity, is somehow or other directed to the world: “The instinctive intentionality of monads belongs to their worldly being and life, their satisfaction is worldly directed” (169). Nevertheless,

owing to the lack of explicit intentional references, there are no objects and horizonedness is fused with the undifferentiated hyle. We have “instinct with an empty horizon” (283).

Differentiation of unities occurs on the basis of this undifferentiated ground. For Husserl, the life-stream as a time-stream amounts to a preontic being. It is “the first level of ontification or objectivation, of which the uppermost level is the natural world, [...]” (198). In a second level, particular units grow out of the hyle: first, the particular sense-fields, and, then, the particular formations that within them exert a stimulus or attraction on the ego. The streaming life (*das strömende Leben*) in its twosidedness is subject to the essential set of laws of association and first of all to those of the primal association pertaining to passive temporalization. This means that differentiated hyletic data emerge through an identification in the hyletic primal sphere. At this primal level, a similarity-identification obtains between a primal impression and the corresponding retention.: “In the last hyletic primal sphere there is identification only by an intentional modification that continuously differentiates itself; it is the intentional modification of ‘retention,’ the continuous depresentification, we could say, which as a modification of similarity makes up in a flowing manner a succession of temporalization and in this succession continuously produces in a process a unifying identity” (134). Thus, the retentional modification brings forth a constant identification between its content and that of further similar phases. The primal hyle is constituted in the flow of time through an association of what is similar in its adjoining phases. As Husserl writes in the following passage, the time-constituting flow is at the basis of hyletic differentiation: “Of course, I always need two different kind of things: the flowing field of ‘lived-experiences,’ in which there is continuously a field of primal impression, which fades away in retention, and has before itself protention – on the other hand the ego that is affected from there and motivated to action” (118).

Husserl also deals with “the problem of instinct as a principle of association of affections” (196 n.). Unities emerge as a primal mode (*Urmodus*) of affection out of associative process that are connected in an instinctive manner, and arouse particular feelings and kinaesthesia that lead to an originary turning-toward (*Zuwendung*). This is the level of the primal affection of intentional unities on the side of what is alien along with a primal will and a primal feeling on the side of the ego. These three primal moments lay out the fundamentals for the building-up of the world, but are not to be considered yet as moments of a “consciousness of,” because the intentional unities have not yet been apperceived and hence are still not objects. This is the level of the lowest constitution of unities in “the universe of pre-being” (*das Universum des Vor-Seienden*) (187), i.e., in “the primal temporalization in which a hyletic quasi-world, alien to the ego (*eine ichfremde hyletische Quasi-Welt*), has its pre-being (*Vor-sein*)” (350). As regards the other side of the life-stream, there is “the ego for which this pre-world (*Vor-Welt*) is, through which or through the functioning of which, in affection and action, the genuine world (*die eigentliche Welt*) comes to creation, in a plurality of levels of creation, to which relative worlds (*relative Welten*) correspond” (350).

The primal hyle corresponds to a pre-nature and is a previous level for the constitution of the meaning “nature”. It is prior to “apprehension” or “consciousness of,” with regard to which it will function as a “natural hyle.” Husserl attempts to show the “sense of the separation between a primal sphere of being = nature (*Ur-Seinssphäre* = *Natur*) and a world of goods in the usual sense” (318 n.), i.e., a world that expresses human intentions and puts them into practice. As we have seen, an originary instinct of objectivation, which conditions kinaesthesia, and a motivation by feeling-affectations (*Gefühlaffektionen*) of pleasure in contrast to negative feelings of aversion that can block the objectivation, are the presuppositions of a “natural objectivation” or “primal objectivation (*Urobjektivation*) that yields nature” (321). It is through feeling that hyletic data, by attraction or repulsion, can motivate the ego to a willing or reluctance (*Hin-Wollen, Wider-Wollen*). Hence Husserl can speak of “the data of sensation, with their feeling moments, and also the impulse moments (*Triebmomente*)” (113). The primal objectivation must take place in a normal situation in which there is only a situation of pleasure: “Here the Aristotelian assertion ‘All human beings by nature have delight in *aisthesis*’ obtains its truth” (321).

Hyletic unities have an effect on the ego because they affect and stimulate, and the ego answers to this stimulation with an activity directed to the unities as a goal, as a that-toward-which (*Woraufhin*) (see 83). Here begins the process of ontification. The outstanding data are both a stimulus and a goal. They affect the ego and hence are the *terminus a quo* for instinctive intentions. In the sphere of vision, e.g., these intentions are motivated by visual data and are fulfilled in the constitution of visual things. There is an instinctive excitation of oculomotor kinaesthesia and other kinaesthetic systems that are grounded on other intertwined instinctive tendencies. The oculomotor kinaesthesia, when they are under way, bring forth the discharge of an optic intention, but this unloading of tension is only a passage way to a further stage. For the optic datum attained summons up new kinaesthesia that in turn lead to new optic data. This means that every optical datum is both a *terminus ad quem* and a *terminus a quo*. For the optic and the kinaesthetic processes “do not proceed one next to the other (*nebeneinander*), but rather in the unity of an intentionality, [...]” (329). Husserl characterizes the instinctive drive as “the preliminary form of a preliminary possession” (*die Vorform der Vorhabe*), i.e., as an anticipation of secondary sensibility, and the satisfaction of the drive as “the preliminary form of the genuine act (*die Vorform des eigentlichen Aktes*)” (326).

Let us now turn to a twofold constitution of horizons that goes hand in hand with the constitution of units and is preserved in the further levels. On the one hand, the force of affection of the stimulus can amount to nothing. A true affection is the presupposition for an answer of the ego. There is a graduality in the obtrusiveness (*Aufdringlichkeit*) of hyletic unities within a “horizon of affection” (240) in the sense of a background with a varying degree of affecting components that can drown each other down in a competition, in which the relegated unities lose their stimulating power, fall out of the horizon of affection, and do not motivate

the ego to turn toward them. On the other hand, due to temporalization, the impression as a primal mode of hyle turns into empty modes. Thus, horizonedness appears in this second level as an empty reference.

A third level is that of constituting acts that operate in the unity of a world-constitution. In its lowest sublevel, the first world-apperception concerns primordial nature, i.e., a world in the invariant form of spatio-temporality and causality. Individual objects are experienced as objects within an open world-horizon. As regards horizonedness, beyond the theme to which the ego is directed, there is a first background composed by what is not observed thematically but nevertheless is noticeable because it still partakes of the horizon of affection. A second background is made up by the unconscious that has no affecting capacity because it amounts to a total nullity. A whole of null-affections and null-implications is blended into a nonseparated total null and makes up “a background of the ‘unconscious,’ of what does not speak according to all its ‘components’ but also as a whole, of a night that is silent, that exercises no call, and contains no call in itself” (192). Along with this outer null-horizon, there is the inner null-horizon made up by what is implicit in the theme. Furthermore, Husserl refers to a third type of background in order to account for something different from the theme that concerns the ego in a secondary manner. As he puts it: “Different concepts of background: 1) the absolutely unconscious, the absolute zero; 2) the ‘unobserved,’ although ‘noticeable,’ affecting, not getting through with its voice; 3) that with which the ego has to do, not primarily, but rather ‘still’ has to do” (184).

Husserl analyzes as a fourth level that of the experiencing acts conceived of as particular apperceptions enclosed within a universal world-apperception. This means that objects are here experienced within the world as a ground or basis. We know objects by virtue of constituting acts, and this knowledge gives rise to an acquaintedness that can be actualized in experiencing acts. Concerning this, Husserl has the following to say: “Higher-level objects have a) a stratum that is based on the affecting stimulus-field and the affective performances of the lowest level determined by it, and b) a stratum of the field of affection, that of the higher-level affections, and, accordingly, they have a double constitutive building-up out of constituting acts as against the acts of experiencing actualization of the lower-level apperceptions, in which the ‘finished’ objectivity is experienced and ‘intended’ in empty modes of experience. Experience of a thing and thing-meaning (*Dingmeinung*) is not constitutive with regard to the thing; it is [...] a fore-meaning (*Vormeinung*) that fulfills itself in the cognizance-talking, an intention directed to the thing” (336). In this passage several points are made. First, lower-level affections are those of a primary sensibility that stands in connection with the fields of sensation. Second, lower-level apperceptions are those in which sense-giving is carried out for the first time. Third, higher-level affections are a new name for what Husserl also calls secondary sensibility, i.e., the affection by sedimented past acts, which are now called constituting acts. They compose our world-possession in contrast to world-experience, and their correlate is the world as an acquired ground: “[...] every constitution has now only the possibility of enlargement of the

determinate predelineation and of the new formation in a fully built horizon-style or ontological style” (241). Fourth, higher level-objects amount to objects that have been previously constituted and make up our acquaintedness with the world. Experience of these higher-level objects does not constitute them because it only entails an anticipation that requires a fulfillment. This means that transcendental subjectivity faces a world that is experienced appresentations as a present surrounding world: “The last world-level,” Husserl writes, “is that in which the world has an open infinite horizon and being-sense, which has everything that has to be shaped in the particular case already predelineated in this horizon, in this sense-form.” (239; see 396).

For Husserl, the inquiry back to primality starting from the constitution of a differentiated world can be achieved in two ways. The retrogression can take place in every present because an undifferentiated flow underlies the hyletic data and acts that emerge within it, and can refer back to the past history of the ego: “With regard to primality (*Urtümlichkeit*), it is natural to distinguish the primality of myself, of who inquires back starting from the constituted world, of myself the mature ego that meditates on myself, and the primality emerging out of the further retrospective inquiry, the primality of the ‘beginning’ of the constitutive genesis, primality reconstructed through the uncovering of the genesis” (279). Thus, Husserl distinguishes, on the one hand, the radical and permanent origin, of which the mature ego becomes aware when he becomes conscious of himself, and, on the other, the temporal beginnings of the constitutive genesis. Both types of analysis deepen the abovementioned genetic analysis in the second level with the disclosure of depth strata in the genesis of transcendental subjectivity.

The first type of inquiry into primality shows that the sensuous contents to which the ego turns in order to grasp them cannot be an ultimate component because they are the outcome of associative and temporal syntheses that occur in the primal flow of the living present. From what is shaped or differentiated in these syntheses one must distinguish the differentiating or shaping stream, which, because it is not subject to this shaping, is an absolute and undifferentiated origin. On the one side there is the content that is constituted, and on the other the constitutive flow that is beyond the constituted because it sets up the framework within which differentiations appear. So the inquiry into primality turns toward “my living-streaming present in its full concreteness as the primal ground and the primal source (*Urboden und Urquell*) of all validities of being that are actual for me in the present.”<sup>6</sup> The analysis concerns the ego as “‘supra-temporal’”, i.e., as “the ego that always is now and remains now” (202). Hence it does not have the sense of a regression to a moment of the past “because it is a matter, so to say,” as Husserl holds, “of eternal structures, which I must find, whenever I am a wakeful ego.”<sup>7</sup> Husserl adds: “I <am> in my primality a constantly streaming ‘passivity’ of an absolutely invariable structure; [...]” (279). These structures, to be found in the

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<sup>6</sup> Hua XXXIV, 186 (Ms. C 3).

<sup>7</sup> Hua XXXIV, 385 (Ms. C 7).

lowest constitutional stratum of transcendental subjectivity, encompass a universal form, which is time as the framework for particular unities or wholes, and the universal principle of genesis, which is association insofar as it concerns content and brings forth these particular unities. By virtue of them a “genetic beginning” is constructed for a “living genesis” (*lebendige Genesis*) through an “abstractive inspection” (352) that rises above the constituted world.

The other type of retrospective inquiry gets back to a primal initial horizon as an underlying basis for the subsequent constitution of the world. Hence Husserl brings out the different strata according to which the world-consciousness has been structured in the correlative development of the world and the ego. Starting from the primal horizon (*Urhorizont*) outlined by an inherited make-up (*Erbmasse*) that depends on instincts, the analysis goes on to show how a child “grows into the world, [...] into the historical status of the self-developing intersubjectivity” (431).<sup>8</sup> This second method reveals a past origin for what also has a permanent source in the living present. It considers a sedimentation that is the outcome of a temporalization that has taken place in the living present. In other words, it reveals a historical genesis besides the living genesis. Passages as the following raise the difficult question of how to interpret the profound connection between both types of retrospective inquiry: “In the genetic retrospective inquiry we construct as a beginning the still deprived of world-preliminary field and pre-ego (*das noch weltlose Vorfeld und Vor-ich*), which is already a centre, but not yet a ‘person,’ let alone a person in the usual sense of a human person” (352).

#### 4 Post-Husserlian Phenomenology

Husserl’s key insight is to see that the world can be depicted according to various characterizations and levels, that it has a fluent status, and that it can be deconstructed into a pre-world or primal world so that a ready-made world is nothing but a first step in phenomenological research. This makes way toward post-Husserlian standpoints, and three points can be made in this regard at the close of our study.

First, there is Heidegger’s view, in *Being and Time*, that emphasizes an originary openness of the world in its worldliness. After expounding the reference context that constitutes worldliness as significance, Heidegger gives a further step when he states that anxiety as a mode of attunement is not about an innerworldly being. This means that the totality of reference presupposed by innerworldly beings breaks down, and that “on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is innerworldly, the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness.”<sup>9</sup> The counterpart of anxiety and its annihilation of innerworldly beings is to be found, not in the phe-

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<sup>8</sup> See Hua XV, 604.

<sup>9</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1996), p. 187. Trans. by Joan Stambaugh: *Being and Time* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 175.

nomenological reduction as has been claimed,<sup>10</sup> but rather in the vanishing of intentions within the reduced world. We must recall that Husserl differentiates a thematic or nonthematic patent world and a latent world that encompasses a horizon of acquaintedness and a horizon of nonacquaintedness. Acquaintedness is made up by habitualities and interests that outline the sphere of significance. It amounts to a complex of objectifying intentions (*Vorstellungen*) stemming from the familiar ground. The important point is that latency allows for degrees of distinctness that fade out into a sphere of nonacquaintedness, i.e., an empty horizon in which nothing is intended. This means that Husserl pushes the inquiry into the world to the point where, beyond horizons of empty objectifying intentions, there is only an undifferentiated horizon. He claims that “everything in the mode of horizonedness (*alles Horizonthafte*) is the facultative possibility of passing over to new experiences, from which new predelineations follow, with new paths for actual verifying perception, and beyond there is always an empty horizon without determinate predelineation, but always with the sense of possible paths of experience with the corresponding, unacquainted, undetermined predelineations” (263).<sup>11</sup>

Insignificance, in the sense of the loss of relevance of innerworldly beings, appears for Husserl where objectifying intentions disappear. This occurs not only in the world as the marginal horizon next to the clarified patent world and the differentiated latent world, but also in the world as the underlying basis for modalizations. In both cases the world appears as the other of an object. This means that the world-horizon must be referred back exclusively to transcendental life that sustains it. Yet this does not mean that it must be referred genetically to the subjective history in which the ground of sense and validity has been constituted because it falls outside acquaintedness and its previous givenness of significance. Hence the distinction between a constant and a familiar changing ground. By way of the vanishing of objectifying intentions both in a marginal horizon, which is the ground of potentially differentiated intentional objectifications, and in an underlying horizon, which is the ground for the replacement of one by another, Husserl comes to a situation in which, to take up Heidegger’s words, “the world is all that obtrudes itself in its worldliness.”<sup>12</sup>

A second post-Husserlian view highlights a realm that is prior to the manifestation of the world as the universal horizon of objects. It is well known that Mau-

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<sup>10</sup> See Jean-François Courtine, *Heidegger et la phénoménologie* (Paris: Vrin, 1990), p. 235; and Rudolf Bernet, *La vie du sujet. Recherches sur l’interprétation de Husserl dans la phénoménologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), p. 113.

<sup>11</sup> See Hua XIV, 150, 334.

<sup>12</sup> Søren Overgaard refers to “certain structural similarities between the two accounts.” First, the world is not conceived as a totality of entities, but as “a structure that allows entities to come forth.” Second, the world is given as a nonthematic background, i.e., as something that normally does not announce itself. Third, both views start with the individual entity and show that through its “references to” alone can the world be understood, so there is an agreement in the “characterization of the world as a whole of references.” See S. Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World, Phaenomenologica 173* (Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004), pp. 126-130. My purpose of this paper is to show a further point of convergence.



rice Merleau-Ponty explicitly interprets Husserl's *Vor-Sein* as "the most primordial Being" or "the brute and Savage Being against the sedimented-ontic being."<sup>13</sup> He describes nature as a layer of the primordial Being that entails a capacity of action that we can use even if it is not our own, i.e., an originary productivity that never ceases to support all worldly productions. This also means that nature "does not want to let itself be enclosed in a preformed mould," and is to be found under all cultural and historical developments as the "roots" or the "matrixes" of history in the manner of "our primal history of fleshly beings co-present to a unique world."<sup>14</sup> Similarly, as has been mentioned, Husserl refers in the C-manuscripts to a natural core of the world: "'Nature' is a core, matter (hyle) of the world as experienced – a core that accepts 'spiritualization' and already has it beforehand in world-consciousness" (111). Merleau-Ponty believes that this immemorial nature entails that we are faced with a primal history in the sense that human action reassumes in a "different architectonic" the elements afforded by a "logos of the natural world."<sup>15</sup> The bearer of meaning is always present in a thinglike manner, and we always have the possibility of detachment and distantiation from the expressed sense. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, I can always treat cultural objects as patterns of form and color devoid of human meaning.<sup>16</sup>

Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty's notion of a "between" out of which subject and object emerge is clearly anticipated in the first level disclosed by the inquiry back into primality, i.e., the life-stream. In spite of its two-sidedness, the stream remains undifferentiated both in what concerns the contents of each side and with regard to the sides themselves because the primal hyle and the primal kinaesthesia are so inextricably intertwined that, as Husserl holds, they are "abstract when considered by themselves." So we can see that primal kinaesthesia makes up a yet inarticulated realm of possibilities out of which an articulated order of movements can constitute itself.

Finally, there is the view of a different order of manifestation than that of the world. Husserl's notion of a "primal feeling" (*Urgefühl*) tied to the "primal affection of nonobjects" (335) also anticipates Michel Henry's contrast between the cognizance of life through self-affection within the radical immanence of affectivity and the knowledge of consciousness through an intentional relationship with the external world. This author advocates the thesis that at the basis of all intentional reference to the world, and all worldly developments, there are nonworldly affective tonalities that enable life to intend the world and display its productive force. Thus, the disclosure of the world has its condition of possibility in a self-disclosure or original self-manifestation or self-affection in which there is no intending or referring, i.e., no distance between what appears, the appearing, and that to which it appears Henry claims that a radical reduction must go beyond the transcen-

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<sup>13</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *La nature*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1995, pp. 267, 282.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 58, 111; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Signes*, Paris, Gallimard, 1960, p. 227.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 282.

<sup>16</sup> See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 413.

dental reduction in order to set aside “this zone of light that we call the world in order to discover that without which this horizon of visibilization would never become visible, namely, the self-affection of its transcendental exteriority in the pathos with no outside of Life.”<sup>17</sup> This antecedence of feeling with regard to intentional activity, in a level in which the ego is not separated from itself, is also present in the following passage of Husserl: “The ‘addressing’ of content is not a call to something, but rather a feeling being-there of the ego (*ein fühlendes Dabei-Sein des Ich*), and certainly not first a being-there through getting there and reaching. The ego is not something for itself (*für sich*), and neither is the alien to the ego (*das Ichfremde*) something separated from the ego, and between both there is no space for a turning toward. Rather the ego and what is alien are inseparable; the ego is a feeling ego in each content in the content complex and in the whole complex. Feeling is the set of states (*Zuständlichkeit*) of the ego before any activity, and, when active, in the activity” (351 f.). Nevertheless, it should be noted that Husserl keeps referring to the alien even in this undifferentated level because the twosidedness of the life-stream is always stressed. He never cuts off self-affection from hetero-affection. Consequently, a pure self-affection would have to be considered as a second-stage contraction in which it becomes unravelled from outwardness, so that, even if not manifested in the world, it at least presupposes the world. Husserl does refer to “the constant structure hyle and hyle in feeling-characters,” but immediately adds: “We distinguish unity of hyle and unity of feeling. Each has its different manner of modification, [...]” (352).

At the end of this closing reference to worldly obtrusiveness regardless of beings, pre-worldly Being, and nonworldly manifestation, we may recall that, when he refers to the problems that have to do with pauses in intersubjective constitution as issues that can be examined by means of an archeological discovery, Husserl makes in passing the following remark: “They make up the metaworldly-transcendental questions that transcend the whole level of the transcendental interpretation of the world” (23). This very incidental reference to a metamundane and metatranscendental sphere provides motives to pursue the analysis in the direction of new levels in the margins of those that have been described. And the view that pre-given worlds must be surpassed in order to reveal their sources or conditions of possibility is central in post-Husserlian phenomenology.

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<sup>17</sup> Michel Henry, *De la phénoménologie. I. Phénoménologie de la vie*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2003, p. 90.