Sartre and the unity of consciousness: a brief record of "the transcendence of the ego"

Abstract

In this article, we intend to discuss the assumptions embedded in La Transcendance de L'Ego (1936), in which Sartre exposes his thesis– ontophenomenological- of a transcendental ego, corollarily. By advocating it, the philosopher draws upon two reciprocal criticisms: the first aims to rebut the idea of a formal ego that would be contained in consciousness (position taken by Kant and Husserl). The second contrasts with the existence of a material ego also resident in consciousness (a position adopted by classical psychology). Therefore, Sartre reconfigures the Husserlian doctrine of intentionality as there is no being-for-itself as a phenomenological residue obtained by ‘epoque’, but a pre-reflective Cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian Cogito. All positional consciousness of an object is, necessarily, non-positional consciousness of self. This is because the very essence of intentional consciousness is pure lightness, pure flow, movement to ..., outward rather than inward. This movement is, therefore, a being of the world, just like the ego of another. It is the very movement of the transcendence of the ego.