O espectro da metametafísica

Mapeando o estado da arte na metafísica científica

Palavras-chave: Metametafisica, Metafisica, Metafísica científica, Metodologia da metafísica, Naturalismo

Resumo

O realismo científico é comumente associado à metafísica. Uma encarnação atual de tal associação diz respeito à exigência de uma caracterização metafísica das entidades sobre as quais alguém está sendo realista. Isso, às vezes, é chamado de “Desafio de Chakravartty” e codifica a afirmação de que, sem uma caracterização metafísica, não se tem uma imagem clara dos compromissos com os quais o realismo está engajado. A conexão necessária entre a metafísica e a ciência naturalmente levanta a questão de saber se tal demanda é adequadamente satisfeita e como a metafísica se relaciona com a ciência a fim de produzir o que é chamado de “metafísica científica”. Aqui, mapeamos algumas das opções disponíveis na literatura, gerando um espectro conceitual de acordo com como cada visão aproxima a ciência da metafísica. Isso é feito com o propósito de esclarecer o debate atual sobre a possibilidade de garantia epistêmica que a ciência poderia conceder à metafísica, e como diferentes posições abordam de forma diferente a espinhosa questão relativa à tal garantia.

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Biografia do Autor

Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis, SC, Brasil; Universidade Federal do Maranhão (UFMA), São Luís, MA, Brasil.

Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), em Florianópolis, SC, Brasil; professor da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), em Florianópolis, SC, Brasil. Professor colaborador do Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia na Universidade Federal do Maranhão (UFMA), em São Luís, MA, Brasil. Bolsista de Produtividade em Pesquisa do CNPq (Nível 2). Membro do International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information e do Grupo de Pesquisa em Lógica e Fundamentos da Ciência (CNPq).

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), Florianópolis, SC, Brasil.

Doutor em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), em Florianópolis, SC, Brasil; pesquisador pós-doutoral da Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), em Florianópolis, SC, Brasil. Membro do International Network on Foundations of Quantum Mechanics and Quantum Information e do Grupo de Pesquisa em Lógica e Fundamentos da Ciência (CNPq).

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Publicado
2021-12-27
Como Citar
Arenhart, J. R. B., & Arroyo, R. W. (2021). O espectro da metametafísica: Mapeando o estado da arte na metafísica científica. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 66(1), e41217. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41217
Seção
Epistemologia & Filosofia da Linguagem