Nós temos livre-arbítrio?

Palavras-chave: Livre-Arbítrio, Liberdade

Resumo

Adotei uma abordagem experimental para essa questão. Atos de vontade livre são precedidos por uma mudança elétrica específica no cérebro (readiness potential, RP)3, que inicia 550 milissegundos antes do ato. As pessoas tomaram consciência da intenção de agir 350-400 milissegundos depois do início do RP e 200 milissegundos antes do ato motor. O processo volitivo é, portanto, iniciado inconscientemente. Mas a função consciente ainda poderia controlar o resultado; pode vetar o ato. O livre-arbítrio não é, portanto, excluído. Essas descobertas impõem restrições às visões de como o livre-arbítrio pode operar; não faria iniciar um ato voluntário, mas poderia controlar a realização. As descobertas também afetam perspectivas de culpa e responsabilidade.

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Biografia do Autor

Ângelo Roberto Ilha da Silva, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil.

Professor do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Pós-doutor em neurociências pela Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais. Doutor em Direito pela Universidade de São Paulo.

Daison Nelson Ferreira Dias, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, Brasil.

Mestre em neurociências pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul. Mestrando em Direito pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul.

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Publicado
2021-06-09
Como Citar
da Silva, Ângelo R. I., & Dias, D. N. F. (2021). Nós temos livre-arbítrio?. Veritas (Porto Alegre), 66(1), e38524. https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.38524