Anguish in the dream: symbolic repetition of the repressed or ontological alterity?

Abstract: In this article, my objective is to confront a structural reading (of Freud’s and Lacan’s meaning) with an ontological reading (of Merleau-Ponty’s meaning) concerning the genesis and clinical interpretation of dreams, regarding the formal operators who guide both readings, highlighting their differences. Beyond the “symbolic operator” - tasked with explaining the formation of unconscious desires that the dream would fulfill - it is my purpose to discuss the differences in how - in each reading - the “real operator” is employed. In both, the real is pointed out as what would explain the emergence of anguish before which the dream would find a limit, leading the dreamer to awake. Therefore, according to each of the readings, the real concerns very different occurrences. And the question I intend to answer in this article is: how does each of these ways of understanding the real affect the comprehension of what anguish is in the dream field? In what sense, for Merleau-Ponty, can the dream be understood as a surreal passage?

Keywords: Dream Freud Merleau-Ponty Anguish Real Surrealism

Angustia en el sueño: ¿repetición simbólica de lo reprimido o alteridad ontológica?

Resumen: En este artículo, mi objetivo es confrontar una lectura estructural (de acepción freudiana y lacaniana) con una lectura ontológica (de acepción merleau-pontyana) sobre la génesis e interpretación clínica de los sueños, teniendo en cuenta los operadores formales que orientan ambas lecturas, destacando sus diferencias. Más allá del “operador simbólico” - encargado de explicar la formación de los deseos inconscientes que el sueño cumpliría - es mi propósito discutir las diferencias en la forma cómo nos empleamos - en cada una de las lecturas - el “operador real”. En ambos se apunta lo real como lo que explicaría la emergencia de la angustia ante la cual el sueño encontraba un límite, llevando al soñador a despertar. Sin embargo, según cada una de las lecturas, lo real se refiere a ocurrencias muy distintas. Y las preguntas que pretendo responder en este artículo son: ¿cómo afecta cada una de estas formas de entender lo real a la comprensión de lo que es la angustia en el campo del sueño? ¿En qué sentido, para Merleau-Ponty, se puede entender el sueño como un pasaje surrealista?

Palabras clave: Sueño Freud Merleau-Ponty Angustia Real Surrealismo

Angústia no sonho: repetição simbólica do recalcado ou alteridade ontológica?

Resumo: No presente artigo é meu objetivo enfrentar uma leitura estrutural (de acepção freudiana e lacaniana) com uma leitura ontológica (de acepção merleau-pontyana concernente à gênese e à interpretação clínica dos sonhos, tendo em vista os operadores formais que orientam ambas as leituras, ressaltando suas divergências. Mais além do “operador simbólico” - incumbido de explicar a formação dos desejos inconscientes que o sonho realizaria - é meu propósito discutir a diferença no modo como - em cada uma das leituras - emprega-se o “operador real”. Em ambas, o real é apontado como aquilo que explicaria a emergência da angústia face à qual o sonho encontraria um limite, levando o sonhador a despertar. Todavia, conforme cada uma das leituras, o real diz respeito a ocorrências muito distintas. E as questões que pretendo responder nesse artigo são: como cada uma dessas maneiras de compreender o real afeta o entendimento sobre o que seja a angústia no campo onírico? Em que sentido, para Merleau-Ponty, o sonho pode ser entendido como uma passagem surreal?

Palavras-chave: Sonho Freud Merleau-Ponty Angústia Real Surrealismo
Introduction

In both Freud's and Lacan's writings, the theme of anguish has always been fundamental to understand to what extent the dream is not only invested with meaning, but with a "meaning" structured from the idea of repression (or castration). The emergence of anguish in the field of the dream would coincide with the real reappearance of the one who properly demanded the dream as a supplement of meaning, since it was devoid of it, precisely, the representative (in Freud's version) or signifier (in Lacan's version) repressed. Understood as the nonverbal residue of the castration of an unrepresentable drive, of which, in some mythic time, it had been part, the repressed representative/signifier is not only the protagonist in the construction of the dream's meaning, but also a real threat to the dream's meaning itself, insofar as – like the residue - it might bring back its own condition of castrated, which means to say, meaningless. And according to this reading that I will call here structural, since it is based on the structuring character borrowed by the repressed representative/signifier, anguish would be the symbolic effect of threat that the real reappearance of the repressed representative/signifier operate on the oneiric meaning, precisely: repetition of castration, this time, of the dream meaning itself.

Merleau-Ponty, in turn, when dealing with Freud's theory on the autonomy of repressed representatives/signifiers to produce, in the field of dreams, a supplement of meaning that they would lack, disagrees with the interpretation that the founder of psychoanalysis gives concerning about what the anguish is. As Freud thinks, Merleau-Ponty denounces, anguish would delate not only the repetition of castration, but also a certain notion of identity that the oneiric sense would defend. What would eventually link Freud's theory of the dream with the classical thought of identity. That is why - against Freud and in favor of that which, for Merleau-Ponty, consists of the greatest discovery of the founder of psychoanalysis, precisely, the autonomy of repressed representatives/signifiers to produce symbolic connections independently of any core of identity - the philosopher will disconnect the notion of anguish from the idea of threat to meaning. Anguish is not an effect of the symbolic threat posed by repressed representatives/signifiers to the oneiric sense. Rather, it is an ontological occurrence, the very repetition of castration as a real passage from meaning to loss, to death, to oblivion. But, for this, Merleau-Ponty had to change the agent of anguish, who would not be so much the repressed representative/signifier in his threatening reappearance, but the day's residues, whether they are lingering affects of the vigil or latent thoughts. For Merleau-Ponty, because they add to the dream not only an affective and semantic panorama, but, above all, because they reveal these panoramas as degenerating realities, in a state of undoing, the day's residues make happen, along with the symbolic activity carried out by the repressed representatives/signifiers, death as finitude. According to Merleau-Ponty, anguish is a manifestation of real, which is not simply symbolic castration, but ontological castration, as signaled in the surrealist way of portraying the dream.

Now, in this article, it is my goal to revisit these two ways of reading the relationship between dream activity and castration, with the purpose of understanding what, for each one, is the occurrence of anguish. Therefore, I want to know how the "real" of the symbolic return of the representative/signifier differs from the "real" of the degeneration of the day's residues? How are these two ways of thinking about anguish comparable? In what sense, for Merleau-Ponty, can the dream be understood as a surreal passage?

Dreams in structural reading

The structural reading that I propose here is based on the understanding that dreams come from the activity of the “symbolic Other” (or ‘big Other’), if by that we understand the “systematic unconscious” proposed by Freud (1972a, p. 582) and reread by Lacan (1999a, p. 89), namely, the domain of the “representative of thing” (in Freud's sense) or the “signifiers” (in Lacan's sense) resulting from the repression (or castration) of unrepresentable drive units (formed by verbal representations impregnated with affective
impressions, according to Freud’s fiction based, among others, on the theory of psychological phenomena by the philosopher Franz Brentano. This means that - according to the reading of Freud and Lacan - dreams are not governed by verbal representations of conscious language, nor by instincts and laws of nature. Dreams are a kind of “other language” resulting from the fragmentation of verbal representations that - in turn and in an indefinable time - were “mysteriously” associated with affects, forming with them a spontaneous and inalienable whole that Franz Brentano (2008, p. 42) called it a “psychological phenomena”; and which Freud (1974e, p. 170) preferred to call it a ‘drive’. Whence it does not follow that the “other language” operating in the dream was devoid of “structuring”, even though by such a structure we should not understand a semantic law or a natural law. According to Freud’s hypothesis (1972a, p. 107), ratified by Lacan (1986, p. 93), the dream, like all formations of the systematic unconscious, consists of a nonverbal articulation of representatives/signifiers “from” and “around” the repetition of castration of the semantic dimension of language. Which means to say that, for both, castration is not only the origin, but also the limit that organizes and structures the unconscious (or symbolic) articulation of representatives/signifiers that have been stripped of semantic values, apart from speech representations (or meanings). How, specifically, does castration structure the nonverbal articulation within the dream?

In theory - in a “mythical” time and in a borderline place between consciousness and primary physiology, both unrepresentable from the point of view of consciousness, which led Freud (1977, p. 415) to call them ‘preconscious’ - such representatives/signifiers integrated verbal representations, which, in turn, were linked to quantitative impressions caused by stimuli from primary physiology. The name that Freud (1977, p. 426) gave to these impressions was affect (Affeckt). And the link between verbal representations and affects was called by Freud (1976g, p. 119) a drive (Trieb). Because there was no way to eliminate the tension in the drives, which means to say, as long as there was no way to release the tension caused by the affects captured by the verbal representations, since such representations disconnected the affects from the muscular pathways; in this same preconscious place, other verbal representations would operate the destruction of verbal representations invested with affective tension (1977, p. 468) - a destruction which, later on, Freud (1974e, p. 170) would call “repression”. And from the repression of the drive’s verbal representations there would be, on one hand, the affects themselves, now liable to be discharged through the somatic pathways of the primary system. But, on other hand, images would remain as representatives of thing - and no longer as verbal representations (FREUD, 1974c, p. 105-106). This is because, in order to be separated from the affects to which they previously captured, verbal representations had to be “castrated” in their semantic consistencies, which means to say, separated from the speech’s images (or meanings) to which they previously corresponded. Thus, after castration, verbal representations would no longer be valid as meanings, they would no longer function as properly semantic values, qualitative indicators of a verbal attribute applicable to extensive things perceived as phenomena. Or they would lose the verbal aspect, which is why - from the conscience’s point of view - they would seem to be forgotten (FREUD, 1976, p. 315). According to Freud’s terminology (1974c, p. 105-106), after repressed, verbal representations would be reduced to “representatives of thing” separated from an eventual meaning. What, later, would allow Lacan (1998a, p. 513-516) - supported by the structuralism of Ferdinand de Saussure - to affirm that, after repression, verbal images would succumb to the condition of pure signifiers, separated from their eventual Meanings. Now, how would repressed representatives/signifiers function in the realm of the dream?

It is important to remember here that the repressed representatives/signifiers are not private contents of a deep “I”, which would govern them. On the contrary, in the dream, the repressed
representatives/signifiers are traces that are left over from a language that was been stripped of meaning. This does not prevent them from operating as rectors of a nonverbal (or symbolic) construction. This is because, in the realm of dreams, such repressed representatives/signifiers are invested with an empty or negative energy that moves them - and to which Freud (1976f, p. 308) calls “libido”. The libido - as Freud’s metapsychological hypothesis (1972a, p. 603) - would be a kind of “longing” or “lack” (according to the Lacan’s interpretation) that would affect repressed representatives/signifiers concerning to the affect to which they were united within the “drive whole” (Triebziel) from which they were separated. And it is precisely the libido that would lead these same repressed representatives/signifiers to seek other repressed representatives/signifiers, as if they could constitute, along with them, a substitute for the lost drive, rescuing to them the opportunity of a reunion with the affect, whose lack they resent. But, since repressed representatives/signifiers are stripped of semantic and affective values, they need - to constitute themselves as substitute drives - to seek “support” (anlehnung) in the reality of vigil (FREUD, 1972b, p. 187). How to do it if the dreamer is sleeping?

The alternative found by repressed representatives/signifiers is to return to the residues of memory and affect, which, despite not functioning as intersubjective meanings, still retain some semantic value. Here is Freud’s fundamental hypothesis (1972a, 580-583) to explain the dream work, which consists of a dynamic “regression”, a “regressive method”, as if repressed representatives/signifiers - because of the libido strength that characterized them - they could reverse the progressive search for conscious and muscular pathways that would enable them to perform a substitution drive. Through this inversion, instead of forcing the conscious system and the musculature (now dormant) to provide the semantic and affective resources they resented, the repressed representatives/signifiers would return to the affects and semantic values remaining in passive memory as a day’s residues (1972a, p. 525-27). In theory, it is as if the day’s residues could provide the “support” (affective and semantic) that would allow repressed representatives/signifiers to develop a substitute drive. Along with these day’s residues - supported by them (1972b, p. 187) - the repressed representatives/signifiers would operate a work of modification, perversion of affects and latent thoughts preserved as memory, which would then give them a bizarre aspect, as it often happens in dreams (1972a, p. 587). But what would these changes be?

Here is the moment when Freud (1972a, p. 602) properly links repressed representatives/signifiers to the theme of unconscious desire. Of all the effects produced by the regressive movement of repressed representatives/signifiers in the direction of a day’s residues, especially latent thoughts, the most important is that which concerns the configuration of a different, almost mythological object, which goes beyond the domain of the objects presented by latent thoughts, accomplishing what Freud (1976b, p. 206) came to call “fantasy”. Unlike latent thoughts, fantasies are not restricted to the semantic elements derived from the biography and culture of the dreamer and the interpreter. Fantasy is a fiction structured by repressed representatives/signifiers, beyond the semantic content of latent thoughts. In the realm of the dream, fantasy is an object resulting from perversion, from the deviation that, based on the libido or lack that characterizes them, the representatives/signifiers would produce along with the dreamer’s latent memories or thoughts.

The dreamed objects, nevertheless, never fully fulfill the constitutive lack of repressed representatives/signifiers involved in the dream work. This is how Freud will consider them “sexual”. This does not mean that they are objects relating to semantic content of a genital nature or relating to coitus, primarily or exclusively. If, in the dream, the objects articulated (fantastically or symbolically) by the repressed representatives/signifiers have a “sexual” nature, this concerns the fact that they are always partial objects, which never recover, in fact,
the lost affect and, by extension, the “original” drive object repressed. Even so, despite being sexual - in the sense of partials - such objects operate the “fantasmic” (according Freud) or “phantasmatic” (according Lacan) realization of what the repressed representatives/signifiers sought, namely, the replacement of the of the original drive object (which they integrated before castration). And it is in this strict sense that they can be considered objects of the fulfillment of a wish.

Now, for both Freud and Lacan, despite being separated (by castration) from the domain of meaning (semantics), the repressed representatives/signifiers present in the dream field would still operate in a structured way. And the structure that they would use would come from the second effect of castration, which is the fantasmic search for a substitute drive object and, as such, also sexual, because always partial. Castration is not only the structural operator “from” which it is possible to understand in what terms the dream emerges as the realization of another, partial and, in this sense, sexual language. Castration is also the operator “around” which can offer dream construction as a substitute for meaning, seeking a substitute meaning.

Desire as a defense and real as a symbolic repetition of the repressed: anguish

There is yet another aspect for Freud to consider regarding the dream’s sense. This aspect is also related to the structuring presence of repressed representatives/signifiers, this time to demarcate something that does not have to do with the genesis of this autonomous symbolic activity, which Freud called “systematic unconscious” and Lacan “symbolic Other”; nor with the construction of “sexual” fantasies about the substitute object of the lost drive. This time, the reference to the structuring presence of repressed representatives/signifiers has to do with the demarcation of a limit for symbolic constructions, which Freud (1976b, p. 257) relates to the awakening of the dreamer.

In theory - for the common understanding - it is as if the dream were a protection to sleep in the face of the stimuli that the dreamer was subjected to. However, against this understanding, Freud (1976b, p. 165) will try to show that the dreamer’s awakening is not caused by external stimuli. Such stimuli, when they occur, are usually incorporated by repressed representatives/signifiers as material for the dream work of fantasizing the realization of a sexual desire. What effectively awakens the dreamer is the advent of anguish, which, in turn, corresponds to a third register or mode of appearance of castration in the dream field (FREUD, 1976b, p. 262). This time, as a cause of anguish, castration is not just psychoanalytic fiction concerning the origin of repressed representatives/signifiers. Nor does it have to do with the fantasmic effects produced by repressed representatives/signifiers over latent thoughts, thus transformed into substitutive sexual-drives. Now castration refers to a repetition, precisely, the repetition of the destruction imposed on the drives, this time, substitutes. What would trigger an anguish effect along with the substitutive drives carried out in the dream, since their symbolic units, even if fantasmic, would be threatened. But what would threaten sexual-drives in the realm of dreams?

Freud’s hypothesis (1972a, p.594) is that sexual-drives would be threatened by the repressed representatives/signifiers they would serve. What would make dream objects - as sexual-drives - start to perform other function than just the fulfillment of a fantasy to replace the lost drive. Henceforth, dream objects, beyond the fulfillment of desire, would have to play a defensive function against repeated castration. This is what will lead Zizek (2001, p. 6) to postulate that, in some moment of the dream, the fantasies formulated - the objects that in a “sexual” way would restore the lost drive to life - would constitute a “traumatic encounter” with the real of castration. This is the moment that the dream becomes itself in a “nightmare”. Such an encounter would be led by the “subjects” themselves responsible for the articulation of the dream objects, precisely, the repressed representatives/signifiers. As they said themselves again, such representatives/signifiers
reintroduced the non-place, the non-sense from which, precisely, castration came from. What would demarcate the return of what cannot be modified, sublimated, incorporated, precisely, the real of castration. In Lacan's words (1999a, p. 152):

> revelation of the real in that which is less penetrable, of the real without any possible mediation, of the ultimate real, of the essential object that is nothing more than an object, but this something before which all words stop and all categories fail, the object of anguish par excellence.

The real is not something transcendent here, as a kind of another ontological polarity of language, but the very limit of language, in the case of dreams, of castrated language, formed by repressed representatives/signifiers. And the effect of this traumatic encounter between the dream narrative and the real of castration is anguish. Which means that the dream is less a way of defending sleep against the threats of reality than a way of defending fantasies against repeated castration (FREUD, 1974b, p. 147). When it presents itself, reality seems safer than sleep, as if the dream should continue to be awake, as an expanded defense, formulated as a wake-up narrative.

According to Freud's hypothesis (1976b, p. 262), in view of the imminence of the occurrence of the repetition of castration (which could has as unfold the advent of anguish), the repressed representatives/signifiers would awake the dreamer, they would activate consciousness in order to save sexual objects. What, therefore, would reveal this other facet of sexual objects: at the same time that they have their genesis from castration, specifically in the work of repressed representatives/signifiers along with latent thoughts, such objects have their limit in the repetition of castration, against which they defend themselves. When such a defense fails, when the castration of representatives/signifiers is repeated again; this is the moment of anguish, which dissipates the dream, undoes it, causes the dreamer to awake. Now, the repetition of castration and its respective anguish effect is what Freud (1976d, p. 37) - in the 1920s - came to call the death drive (and what Lacan will call the real register). The real, as a “death-drive”, is the repetition of symbolic castration, which, in the dream, becomes explicit as anguish.

**The dream in ontological reading**

The ontological reading that I propose from the studies of Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 69-70) on Freud's theory of dreams takes into account that, in addition to the unconscious realization of desires and the defense against its own symbolic limits, the dream is also the expression of a non-symbolic otherness, which is not a subject of signifiers (like the systematic or symbolic unconscious), nor an imaginary subject (like the Cartesian ego or Freudian consciousness). For Merleau-Ponty (s.d., p. 269), the non-symbolic otherness that emerges in the dream is the second chain, 'unconscious'. Or this non-symbolic otherness has to do with the inalienability of the world as an "immemorial background" (1964b, p. 86), "real trail" (1959, p. 436-437) of what "precedes language" (1964a, p. 43) as its "autrui" or "somebody else" (1964a, p. 322-323) - which is why I propose to call this otherness as real Other.

It is necessary to clarify, however, that Merleau-Ponty (1954-1955, p. 159) agrees with the Freud's thesis (reread by Lacan) that the dream is the fulfillment of wishes understood as symbolic connections between previously repressed representatives/signifiers, which came back on the sleep supported by impressions and representations remaining from the awakening. As stated in a work note, “(a) fantasy plays the role of a mirage at the (level) of the unconscious chain as the mirror image at the level of the actual discourse’ (MERLEAU-PONTY, s.d, p. 269). Likewise, he agrees that, in the realm of the dream, something like the encounter with a limit can happen. However, for Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 179), if it is true that this limit appears in the form of a special and nonspecific affect, which is anguish, this does not mean that such affect is a predicate of language, a characteristic or the way as it reacts to the encounter with the real (of castration). For Merleau-Ponty, anguish is rather the way in which the real (itself) manifests itself as an alterity that cannot be represented, alienated in the field of
the symbolic Other. Such presentation - in turn and beyond the repetition effect of the symbolic castration that could trigger - corresponds to what, in the dream, manifests itself by means of repressed representatives/signifiers as the material and semantic basis of the dream activity of the own's repressed representatives/signifiers, namely: waking impressions and latent thoughts, insofar as both are in a clear state of degeneration. And degeneration is here the very Merleau-Ponty’s definition for the phenomenon of emergence of the real. Beyond the support they provide to repressed representatives/signifiers, lending them an “affective physiognomy” and a “narrative style” that elevates the dream articulation (or latent dream) to the condition of report (manifest dream); as affects and remnants of memory also decompose into their physical materiality and semantic consistency, respectively, both introduce the experience of loss into the dream field, which not only imposes a symbolic limit but simultaneously expresses the world in its inalienable face, as a trace of what language cannot preserve, which means to say, to represent.

Hence it follows that, in the dream, in theory, the day’s residues perform a double function. On one hand, they support the repressed representatives/signifiers in the discharge of libido (or in the realization of the lack) that articulates them in a desiring chain, favoring, in addition to defending against the absence of language, the “figurability” of dream language as a simultaneously narrative and sensitive experience. On other hand - and due to their decomposition - the affects and meanings arising from recent memory introduce the very presence of the world as degeneration, expressing the very birth of the world as inalienable preterit, a time that cannot be inhabited. Which will lead Merleau-Ponty to establish the important relationship between dream experience and finitude. After all, because they are dying, the day’s residues operate in the dream as an indication of what the repressed representative/signifiers cannot stop or achieve, precisely, death. And anguish would correspond exactly to the expression of death, to that moment of passage in which the materiality of the day’s residues would become radical preterit, which means to say, unreachable dimension, indefinite otherness: real Other. It is worth mentioning that, for Merleau-Ponty (1959, p. 436-437), such alterity has nothing to do with the historical, temporal past, which can be reported or memorized. On the contrary, real Other coincides here with the “simple past” in a perfective preterit sense, the past as unknown. As stated in the preface to Hesnard’s work on Freud, “there is at least one spot in every dream at which it is unplumbable—a navel, as it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown” (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1960b, p. 143n). And this is how Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 322) will be interested not only in the association that Freud makes between the themes of the dream and the death-drive, but also in the way in which surrealist artists articulate notions of dream, anguish and death.

**Ontological criticism of the primacy of symbolic castration**

The primacy attributed by Freud to the symbolic dimension of the dream has always been read with reservations on the part of Merleau-Ponty (1945, p. 192). In the 1940s, the philosopher believed that Freud’s metapsychological reflections were confused with a metaphysics about causality in dreams. In the 1950s, however, most likely due to...
his proximity to Lacan (according ROUDINESCO, 1993, p. 140) Merleau-Ponty (1960b, p. 291) changes his point of view. Finally, he recognizes Freud’s effort to characterize the autonomy of repressed symbolism to produce meaning independently of an articulating power. Which does not mean - according to the philosopher - that Freud had fully succeeded. After all, by insisting on the idea that - within the scope of the dream - the activity of repressed representatives/signifiers simultaneously would unleash a symbolic productivity and a threat to that same productivity, Freud would have implied that all dream activity would, in some sense, be governed by idea of a ‘subject’, who would be invested with a nonverbal cogito related to his own internal coherence, which would need to be guarded against the threats that the protagonists of the dream would represent for the oneiric whole, precisely, the repressed representatives/signifiers themselves. Now, the association between the thesis that the dreamlike whole is a consequence of the autonomous productivity of repressed representatives/signifiers and the thesis that the dreamlike whole would seek to protect itself from the nonsense evoked by the repressed representatives/signifiers themselves - according to Merleau-Ponty - would reissue the conventional thought of identity.

That latent dreams have a “meaning” (1972a, p. 107), here is Freud’s most important proposal presented in the seven books that make up The Interpretation of Dreams. But the meaning of the question does not have to do with something clear and distinct, which could be understood from the point of view of the grammars that guide the narratives of the vigil. From the vigil’s point of view, in fact, the latent dream is unintelligible to the dreamer himself. But this unintelligibility - believes Freud - is an effect of the report rather than the latent dream. This is because the report would function as a kind of censorship against what was dreamed. This implies admitting that, in relation to his own dream, the dreamer understands a sense that he refuses or cannot know. This is in what sense the analyst would intervene in order to favor that the censored “sense” could be said. Which, of course, has nothing to do with the production of meaning in terms of that which is professes by verbal conscience, and which the hermeneut and the decipherer are concerned with. If the first one infers the global connection of the words used in the report; the second lends meanings - derived from a model or grammar already formulated - to the representatives/signifiers employed in the report. Freud (1972a, p. 111), in turn, when referring to the “meanings” of the latent dream, takes into account that this meaning, despite using latent thoughts and affects (available as day’s residues), consists in the realization of an unconscious desire, if by unconscious desire we understand: the realization of connections between repressed representatives/signifiers among themselves, with a view to the production of a fantastic object in substitution to the repressed original drive. From where the hallucinatory character, merely symbolic of the meaning formulated in dreams, would emerge. What, finally, would end up convincing Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 69-70) about Freud’s boldness and genius, who knew in the dream, the autonomy of language to articulate independently of the laws and semantic conventions:

I... what was most interesting about Freud, - not the idea of a second ‘I think’ that would be what we ignore from us, - but the idea of a symbolism that is primordial, originating from a "non-conventional" [...].

Merleau-Ponty’s enthusiasm, however, is not long-lived. After all, even though he distinguished his notion of oneiric sense from conventional thought governed by logic, Freud sought to demonstrate that, even so, the latent dream would be rigidly structured. And what structured the dream would have to do with what had originated it, namely, the symbolic castration of verbal images, which, due to the repression of their semantic aspects, were reduced to residual representatives/signifiers. To the extent that - within the dream - these representatives/signifiers reveal themselves beyond the dream images that they themselves have created, they would introduce a non-sense, which is the very repressed condition that characterizes them, forcing the
Dream images and, especially, the dream story to be articulated as a form of defense of meaning. Therefore, it would follow that the repressed representatives/signifiers, in the dream, would articulate themselves around two purposes. First, the production of a substitute drive - and what Freud calls a sexual-drive because it is always lacking in something that could fulfill it, complete it. And second, the use of this substitute drive to counteract the threat of repeated castration - which would shift the sexual-drive to the condition of conserving the unconscious system. The “sexual” and “conservation” substitutes drives would correspond, then, to the two fundamental objects of the desire that the dream would fulfill - and that, later, on the occasion of the second topic, Freud (1976d, p. 58) would gather under the same name: life-drive.

Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 200) does not agree with the ontogenetic explanation concerning the origin and mode of functioning of the repressed representative/signifiers within the dream. If, on one hand, the hypothesis of castration of the semantic aspects of images or verbal representations proved to be efficient in explaining the genesis of the systematic unconscious; on other hand, this does not mean - according to the philosopher’s reading - that dream connectivity is commanded exclusively by symbolic castration.

It is Freud himself who admits it when he resorts to the idea that, in order to constitute a dreamlike object, repressed representatives/signifiers need to seek “support” from the day’s residues. However, the main problem found by Merleau-Ponty in relation to the Freud’s resource to the hypothesis that dreams are structured by repressed representative/signifiers has to do with the idea that they ‘threaten’ the semantic consistency of sexual objects produced by phantasmatic mode in substitution to the drive originally repressed. The problem is not so much that the repressed representatives/signifiers appear as meaningless remains. It is, rather, in the Freud’s understanding, according to which, because of this appearance, dream objects - both in the latent dream and in the manifest dream - would be forced to “defend themselves”. The assumption that dreams objects can defend themselves implies, simultaneously, admitting that they are invested with an internal coherence and a cogito about this coherence, that forces them to neutralize the supposed threat presented by the presence of something that has no meaning, in this case, repressed representatives/signifiers.

What in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes characterizes Freud’s tacit adherence to “conventional thought of identity”, as if the unconscious system had to respond to a motive or “cause” that would give it unity, or that would make it a “subject”, a kind of second consciousness or cogito. Here is how Merleau-Ponty (2000, p.203) will say:

To believe that symbolism comes only from repression, and to believe that repression brings it back to the symbolic or dreamlike state as simple deprivation, is pure falsehood in relation to the consciousness of wakefulness always possible. These two errors assume priority of conventional thinking by identity.

Against the thesis that the non-sense conveyed by the repressed representatives/signifiers is capable of mobilizing, within the dream, the unity of the dream sense, its subjectivity; against the recalcitrant presence in psychoanalysis of the “conventional thought of identity”, since Freud understands the unconscious as a system that seeks to fantastically restore the lost drive object; Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 201- 202) will claim the recognition that, at least between repressed representatives/signifiers and day’s residues, a “precarious link” operates, which cannot be thought from the idea of identity or unity. In some sense, the day’s residues lend signifiers a ballast of images and impressions that move the libido to a way wider field of possibilities than the mere replacement of something lost, or the defense against the risk of symbolic castration’s repetition. The use of the idea of a defense - required or structured by the repressed character of the representatives/signifiers who operate in the...
dream - is not necessary. At most, it consists only of one of the infinite possibilities of combination that, freely, repressed representatives/signifiers and day’s residues can establish among themselves. After all, if it is true that - in the dream - the repressed representatives/signifiers present themselves without a specific semantics, on other hand, they can take verbal images and affects from the day’s residues that would otherwise only be possible in the context of vigil, as if, in conjunction between the representatives emptied of semantic value and the day’s residues there was a sort of passage or diffuse communication that gives the dream an aspect of “worldly spontaneity” (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1960a, 94: 1969, p. 122). Against the primacy recognized by Freud to repressed representatives/signifiers, Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 201- 202) will affirm that, in the dream, the day’s residues ensure a kind of expressive bond between the repressed representatives/signifiers and the recalcitrant presence of the world. From the bond’s point of view, the dream is not just an attempt to replace something lost, or a form of defense against the risk of repetition of loss. While the occurrence of the indivision between the day’s residues and the repressed representatives/signifiers, the dream is an area as existential as the vigil (MERLEAU-PONTY, 2000, p.244), only without the consortium or conduct of mental acts of a transparent conscience for itself.

Here, then, Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 214) returns to Freud’s theory about the regressive method practiced by repressed representatives/signifiers, to make it a kind of illustration of the idea of expressive indivisibility that would operate within the dream, in the interval between those representatives and the day’s residues. If repressed representatives/signifiers can return to the day’s residues, if they manage to disperse the libidinal tension (which characterizes them) through affects and traces of memory, this means that - within the scope of the latent dream - they all share an expressive bond. Likewise, in the field of the manifest dream, if affective narratives and pictures are able to signal the presence of a lacking and nonverbal sense, which has yet to be deciphered, this signalization doesn’t have to do with the representation process, but with the expression of an unconscious horizon to which they are linked in an undivided and not transparent way.

Ontological castration: passivity to the otherness of day’s residues

The fact that Merleau-Ponty abdicates symbolic castration as a formal operator in order to explain the transition from the latent dream to the manifest dream does not mean that this operator had lost importance for the philosopher. If it is true that Merleau-Ponty considers the notion of expressive indivisibility more powerful than the castration to describe the slide of the signifiers from an unconscious domain to a conscious domain; whether the notion of expressive indivision seems more appropriate to show the link between day’s residues and repressed representatives/signifiers; this does not mean that he had given up on admitting, for the notion of castration, a prominent place. Especially in the late 1950s, the castration operator began to play a very important role, insofar as he was tasked with illustrating - in the study that Merleau-Ponty did about the dream - the link between dream work and finitude. However, this is not a symbolic link, as if castration were an operator of language. For Merleau-Ponty (2000, 193-194), castration is ontological. Specifically, in the case of the dream, it is operated by the day’s residues, insofar as they express, more than the affective physiognomy and the narrative style of the dream, the very finitude of the world as affect and decomposing image. This is a decomposition that the repressed representatives/signifiers cannot stop or change and, therefore, imposes itself on them as something real, demanding from them a passivity, the passivity of the subject of the unconscious. By signaling the relationship between the day’s residues and the finitude of the world in the dream, Merleau-Ponty (1960b, p. 143n). opens the flank to dialogue with the notion of the real, if for real we can understand what imposes itself as an irreducible alterity before which only we can only passively position ourselves.
The theme of day’s residues has led Merleau-Ponty to conclude that, while on one hand the dream is the symbolic realization of an unconscious desire, on other hand, the dream is also the passivity of the symbolic to something that, despite manifesting itself in present, it is no longer something current, rather the actual deconstruction of the present, the very passage from the present to the past, as if the affects and the remaining images designate a strange manifestation of time, time as deconstruction, as death. Beyond the affective and discursive ballast that the repressed representatives/signifiers lend, the day’s residues - whether they are lingering affects or latent thoughts arising from the waking life – bring up the theme of finitude. And it is not a question of finitude as the notion of symbolic castration signals it, that is, as a threat to the supposed unity of sexual objects formulated in a phantasmic way to replace the originally castrated drives. The finitude that Merleau-Ponty has in mind when dealing with the way Freud introduces the theme of day’s residues concerns the very ontological consistency of affects and latent thoughts available to repressed representatives/signifiers during sleep. In the realm of the dream, it is as if the instituted reality presented itself as meaningless, in a state of undoing, due to the state of sleep that is imposed on the dreamer (MERLEAU-PONTY, 2000, p. 193-194). Memory and affections no longer impose an appeal for continuity, but a passivity to what, from now on, will remain as an unattainable intention, a deprecation of motives that can no longer be known, precisely, the real of the simple past, the past as a dimension lost, undefined alterity, strange, in a word, someone else. Such an alterity is that which, in turn, will impose on the protagonists of dream work, precisely, the repressed representatives/ signifiers, a limit, or, according to Freud’s terminology, castration. Which also means that castration is now ontological. It coincides with the ‘otherness’ introduced by the degeneration of the day’s residues. It is the loss that the day’s residues showed as an insurmountable, inalienable real, an indecipherable past. Or, still, within the scope of the dream, castration is the manifestation of someone else as a lost, silent and, in this sense, anguishing past.

In fact, Merleau-Ponty’s studies (2000, p. 149) on the degeneration on day’s residues - and castration effects in relation to the symbolic work of repressed representatives/signifiers - are driven by the philosopher’s reflections on the other’s ambiguous presence in the experience of perception. Even because, “our waking relations with objects and others especially have an oneiric character as a matter of principle: others are present to us in the way that dreams are, the way myths are, and this is enough to question the cleavage between the real and the imaginary (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1968, p.48)”. However, in the field of perception, other is not just a physical, vital or symbolic image (or structure). Others also have to do with the strangeness arising from the encounter with a self that I am not. As he had already done in the Phenomenology of Perception (1945, p. 473), in the Prose of the world (1969, p. 187), Merleau-Ponty describes the other as a self that I am not, as another myself. But unlike the 1945s text, in the 1960s text Merleau-Ponty will say that what marks the difference between myself and the other is not related to each one’s solipsism. Our difference is not based on tacit knowledge about our fundamental difference. The actions of my “partner” do not lead me to the solipsism of my intentions hitherto ignored and from which, from now on, I will represent the presence of a “doppelganger”. My partner’s actions, this time, lead me to other kind of otherness, precisely, to the other who inhabits my own behaviors, which for me is nothing more than an intimate strangeness, such as the one I experience when staring at me from afar and that makes me feel passive (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1960a, p.118) It is as if, starting from my partner, the other returns to me, where he has always existed, not as a cogito, but as a surprising event (2000, p. 35). Coexistence, therefore, does not reveal to me and to my partner our lonely interests, but our complicity around the stranger, face to which we are passive, because this stranger imposes himself on us. My
anonymous life and that of my partner are now “paired” around this third party - who is "someone else" (autrui) - and in the intermediation of those who alternate sometimes as assets sometimes as liabilities. Merleau-Ponty (1969, p.41) returns to the Husserl’s notion (1931, p. 126) of Paarung, which he translated as coupling (accouplement), to indicate that our intersubjective life is, at first, participation in this strange spontaneity, the coupling of our existences on this surprising anonymous who, at any moment, deprives us of our own intentions; as if they could then be formulated elsewhere, in another way, like another one in fact.

It is in that sense that, for Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 35), in the field of dreams, the degeneration of the day’s residues is the “someone else’s occurrence” (in the coupling between repressed signifiers and sleep). Or yet, it is the event of what imposes - to the symbolic activity commanded by the repressed signifiers - the passivity regime: from passivity to what appears ambiguously, at the same time alive and dying, as a residual presence of the world (MERLEAU-PONTY, 2000, p. 194). That is why, in the semester between 1954 and 1955, in the course entitled The institution, the passivity (L’institution, la passivité), Merleau-Ponty decides to discuss the dream not in the part dedicated to thinking about what the institution is, understanding by ‘institution’ the co-presence of the past as an image that calls for continuation, as imperfective past of the ‘present perfect’, the one that we can always modify, finding another version for him. On the contrary, when dealing with the dream, Merleau-Ponty (2000, p. 206) does it in the part dedicated to thinking about the notion of passivity, which has precisely to do with the experience of meeting with “somebody else” (autrui), presenting himself as a foreign gaze or as the simple unattainable preterit which reaches us as perfective past, as a ‘simple past’ that can no longer be changed (unlike the ‘present perfect’ of institutions, always subject to resumption). This is because, the dream is not simply a response to the call for continuity formulated by images in general, which means to say, by the interlocutors of our language, by laws, rituals, knowledge, including memory. If it is true that in the dream, on one hand, we can recognize the presence of an instituting vector, formed by these rudiments presented in all institutions, which are the signifiers, even though, in the dream, they are repressed signifiers, separated from the symbolic mental system connection that defines consciousness; on other hand, the symbolic work of the dream is based, passively, on affective impressions and recent perceptual images, which, however, no longer have the tenacity they had in the dreamer’s waking state, which is why they now appear as a passage: passage from reality to what no longer has reality.

**Dream as a surreal passage and anguish as the voice of the real**

For Merleau-Ponty, the second way in which Freud analyzes the role of day’s residues in the dream also enables an important reflection on the genesis of the real, if by real we understand what cannot be achieved, modified, such as the someone else’s gaze. After all, in the realm of dreams, the day’s residues designate a passage, a change of state. On one hand, they characterize a (visible) reality arising from the physical and vital dimensions of the dreamer. But, on other hand, in the dream, the day’s residues designate something weak, in a state of degeneration. Which imposes, on the repressed representatives/signifiers, a first presentation of the world as unattainable, as someone else (autrui). That is why, inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s quotes about the way in which surrealist artists think, within their works, the dream experience as a degeneration process of rational images. I propose the use of the ‘surreal’ signifier to describe the genesis of the real, the transformation of day’s residues into something unattainable, like the unattainable preterit revealed by the someone else’s gaze. To put it another way, the dream is surreal because, in it, the day’s residues make the transition from reality to the real of preterit. Or, yet the dream is

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6 According to Soares (2020), 'the surreal, here, must be taken in its critical and disruptive dimension, in its contestation character
surreal because it operates the transition from meaning to anguish; to “anguish, not of freedom, but of engagement” with the world and with others, insofar as they appear as the voice of preterit, which means to say, as an unattainable reality (MERLEAU-PONTY, 2000, p. 168).

In fact, for Merleau-Ponty, unlike the experience of passivity in the awaking life, which always implies the encounter with my lost motives and that someone else’s gaze makes them revive as an absence; in the dream, what is passive has to do with the degeneracy of images arising from material reality, as well as with the degeneracy of symbols instituted and kept as memory. The degeneracy of material images – specifically - would correspond to what, according to Freud’s terminology, Merleau-Ponty calls affect. These are the traces of what at some point presented itself as an image, as an incarnated symbol, for example, the experience of pain or the perception of an object, which now – in the dream’s field - lose their material consistency, as if they could for an instant remain as a mist, as a horizon of dispersion, just like the one that usually accompanies the experience of crying or smiling. The degeneracy of the instituted symbols - in its turn - has to do with the fragmentation of the narratives produced around or beyond the signifiers already spoken, as symbolic searches for signifiers that do not exist yet. Within the scope of the dream, narratives also fade, as if they lost the semantic connection that characterizes them, remaining as scattered, meaningless features. And both elements - the affects and the memory traces of the narratives - would characterize the moment of birth of the real, of the establishment of this absence that, from now on, would remain as a background of preterit, mythical temporality to guide all vital affect and all symbolic narrative, whether is conscious or unconscious.

Now, inspired by the quotes by Merleau-Ponty regarding the way in which surrealist artists seek to express the transformation of the world within the scope of works of art, as if works of art could operate in a dreamlike way, I propose the use of the term ‘surreal’ to designate the transition from reality to real in the realm of dreams. I have in mind, specifically, that passage in which Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 31-32) takes the words of André Marchand, who, in the wake of Paul Klee, would state that:

In a forest, I have felt many times over that it was not I who looked at the forest. Some days I felt that the trees were looking at me, were speaking to me… I was there, listening… I think that the painter must be penetrated by the universe and not want to penetrate it... I expect to be inwardly submerged, buried. Perhaps I paint to break out (CHARBONNIER, 1959, p. 143-145 apud MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964b, p. 31-32).

According to the words of André Marchand, taken up by Merleau-Ponty, due to the inversion in the direction of the gaze, now played by someone else and that could well be the forest, the painter is invited to the passivity regime, to the point of feeling “submerged, buried”. But why would passivity towards the forest impose the sensation of death on the painter? The answer, despite not being highlighted in the use that Merleau-Ponty makes of the quote, perhaps it had to do with the way in which the gaze of the forest - while someone else - would impose itself on the painter, precisely, as an event of finitude, which it is the way of being of the time par excellence. Perhaps that is why, in continuity, André Marchand would say that if he paints himself it is “to break out”. Which would lead Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 31-32) to say right afterwards that “the painter’s vision is a continued birth”. And if it is true, on one hand, that what matters most to Merleau-Ponty (1964b, p. 31-32) in this passage is to signal the mixture produced - in art and perception - when a look meets someone else, to the point of that “it is no longer known who sees and who is seen,
who paints and who is painted"; on other hand, as I propose here to emphasize, according to the aforementioned quote, the someone else’s presence always brings finitude, the undoing of the event, the very passage of time, before which we are all passive, as occurs in the experience of the dream. After all, as shown by the works of Max Ernst, Paul Klee, Salvador Dali, René Magritte, Marcel Duchamp, Frida Kahlo, to name a few7, the dream gives us not only an unconscious meaning, which we can interpret. It also delivers, through decomposing images, the unconscious as a void. It is important to note here that the surreal - as a moment of passage made possible by the degeneration of the day’s residues - is not the one instituted, just as the dream is not a kind of memory. Although the instituted is present in the dream as a day’s residues and also as a repressed representative/signifier, despite the fact that the latent dream can be reported and, in this sense, incorporated into an institution; in the dreamer’s experience, the co-existing institutions - especially the day’s residues - are undergoing deconstruction. Now, the surreal designates this deconstruction of institutions, the transition from reality to the real of preterit.

Whence it does not follow that the day’s residues - which operate the surreal passage - coincides with the real of preterit. This would imply leveling preterit with memory, with what appears as a symbolic narrative, as an imperfective past (like the present perfect tense), which can always be resumed, said again in the current moment of the symbols and images that make up the reality. However, preterit is not memory. It is a mythical time, such as the one that defines for Freud the unconscious itself, the unconscious of the drives that were castrated, that disappeared (and not the unconscious as sediment, blend of signifiers remained of the castration, which define the systematic unconscious). Merleau-Ponty (1964 a, p. 296) is quite clear about this, which leads him to state that:

Freud’s idea of the unconscious and the past as “indestructible” as “timeless” - elimination of the common idea of time as an “Erlebnisse series". - There is an architectural past. According Proust: The real thorns are the thorns of the past [...]. This “past” belongs to a mythical time, the time before time, the previous life “further away from India and China.”

Now, it is this mythical past that Merleau-Ponty relates to the appearance of the real as radical otherness and whose voice is anguish. “The ‘subject’ of the dream (and of anguish and of all life) is the one — i.e., the body as pregnant (enceinte)" of somebody else, which is the past itself (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964a, p. 316). It is a past that can no longer be seen, because it has already been lost, but which continues to look, like someone else’s gaze causing passivity in both the field of perception and that of the dream. Or, still, it is a past that can no longer be said, because it was silenced by the degeneracy of the sensitive and of the institutions, but which continues to vociferate as anguish, someone else’s voice. From which it follows that anguish is not for Merleau-Ponty the malaise that a supposed subject would feel as a result of the threat that the absence of meaning would cause. Anguish is, rather, the voice of the other Real, imposing a limit on the sense (in the field of vigil) as well as on dream fantasy (in the realm of the dream). Be it a cry or the silence of images and signifiers, anguish is the manifestation of others as an ‘immemorial background of the visible’ (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964b, p. 86), voice of a precedence that cannot be remembered or modified. In the realm of the dream, specifically, anguish is the breath of death carried by the degeneration of the day’s residues, on which the repressed representatives/signifiers are supported, as if, in parallel with the symbolic work of producing dreamlike meaning, death could show itself as limit to impose the ontological castration of what in sleep seeks to express itself as life.

7 "Surrealism, in a broad sense, represents the most recent attempt to break with the things they are and replace them with others in full activity, in full genesis, in which the moving outlines are inscribed in filigree at the bottom of being.” (RAYMOND, apud SAINT AUBERT, 2004, p. 225)
Conclusion

In Merleau-Ponty’s assessment, the theoretical treatment dedicated for day’s residues testifies to how much Freud, in the 1900s, when writing the Interpretation of Dreams, took into account something that, however, only in 1920, in the text Beyond the Pleasure Principle, acquired a specific metapsychological status, precisely, the death-drive, as if, in addition to the systematic (or symbolic) unconscious, we should admit the “past otherness” of what is properly unconscious, namely, the “real” of loss and its repetition as an affect of anguish. However, for the founder of psychoanalysis, the death-drive - and the anguish associated with it - has nothing to do with the degeneration of the day’s residues. It is only the effect caused by the real return of castration, just as castration is made known through the repetition of repressed representatives/signifiers beyond the sexual objects that these same representatives articulated. Hence the gap between the way in which the structural reading formulated by psychoanalysis, on one hand, and the ontological reading by Merleau-Ponty, on the other, considers anguish in the dream field.

In fact, in the 1920s text, Freud warns his readers that, even though it is true that, in the realm of the dream, some frightening memories can call for something distressing, which looks like anguish; this kind of anguish is not the same that affects the dream objects themselves. The dream anguish - and for which psychoanalysis is concerned - has to do with the disturbance of the internal unity of the substitutive drives, when their repressed representations come to the fore. In what, then, Merleau-Ponty will oppose Freud. After all, the philosopher considers this way of thinking about dream objects to be problematic, as it implies accepting that they would function as meanings cores invested with a cogito about their own identities, to which they would be threatened by the reappearance of the repressed representatives/signifiers. Anguish, in the context of this experience, would be nothing more than a sense of threat to the identity of a second ego, which is no longer the consciousness of the vigil, but the supposed cogito immanent to dream fantasies.

That is why, against this understanding, which subordinates the dream activity to the conventional thought of identity. Merleau-Ponty will link the anguish to the feeling of death arising not from what was left as the rest of the castration, but from the degeneration of the day’s residues. Such degeneracy is the very manifestation of finitude as a radical otherness. And anguish is but the voice of that otherness, the very occurrence of the real as finitude. Which means that contrary to Freud, Merleau-Ponty will recognize that day’s residues are much more than “support” for repressed representatives/signifiers. Beyond forming, alongside repressed representatives/signifiers, the dream as a whole of expressive remission, the day’s residues introduce a castration that is not the one that psychoanalysis reduces to symbolic order. It is, rather, an ontological castration, as it concerns the degeneration of the world that remains in sleep. Or yet, it is the very manifestation of finitude as a limit, as a strangeness impossible to inhabit and in the face of which the subject (be this subject the conscience of the vigil or the symbolic autonomy of the repressed representatives/signifiers) feels helpless, unable to impose any kind of resistance, leaving only passivity. That is why Merleau-Ponty relates dream anguish to the moment of confrontation with somebody else’s gaze, regarding to which we feel passive, as though we cannot estimate what is going on there, what he wants, making all sorts of reversibility or relationship unfeasible. It is a manifestation of the real as “someone else” (autrui), as real Other, as it is manifested in a surreal way in the degeneration of the day’s residues, which so well by Max Ernst, Paul Klee, Salvador Dali, René Magritte, Marcel Duchamp, Frida Kahlo, to name a few, made “dream” in his works.

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