TEOCOMUNICAÇÃO Religion in the public sphere: a contested field in late modern societies

: Religion has become a highly ambivalent phenomenon in late modernity. For some, it is a lasting resource for meaning, even in a highly ideologi- cally plural society. For others, it belongs in the private sphere, not in the public sphere. What both would probably share, however, is the assumption that a state religion would be in contradiction to the promises of freedom and autonomy of modernity. But where is the place of religion in a democratic society? The text discusses this highly complex question in an examination of two theories that have shaped debates in the field like few others. From this discussion, further perspectives for a theologically founded position that is responsible in terms of democratic theory are given in conclusion.

In Germany there is a special relationship between state and religion. The state is ideologically neutral, but it encourages the religious communities to become publicly involved. That means a religion-friendly separation, no laicism as in France, where laicism itself is elevated to its own world view. In Germany, however, this ideological neutrality means that religions and religious symbols such as the cross may only be hanging up in state institutions such as courts or schools if no one complains. This story is an impressive example of a very fundamental problem: the relationship between state and religion is still highly controversial (GRÜMME, 2018, p. 171-201).
This dramatic situation is exacerbated by the progressive processes of secularisation: in Germany as a whole, believers, be they Christians, The crown jurist of the Third Reich, Carl Schmitt, and others had just believed that the National Socialist state was capable of setting its own world view and thus providing the state with its own foundations. In contrast, Böckenförde refers to traditions that enable legitimation, motivation, but also critical distance (BÖCKENFÖRDE, 1991, p. 112

A consciousness of what is missing: Habermas and religion
For Habermas, religion has long since ceased to be an outdated traditional good to be tolerated as contingency management practice (Hermann Lübbe) only relative to the progressing secularization process, as he had unfolded it in his recourse to Max Weber in his theory of communicative action (HABERMAS, 2019ab;JOAS, 2017). Religion itself is seen as a resource for subjective and 3/10 social identity and meaning-founding processes in the confusing processes of modernity and is seen as relevant in itself, an assumption that ultimately makes him speak of a "post-secular society" in a way that is not entirely unmistakable (BECK, 2008, p. 70;WACKER, 2008;JOAS, 2004, p. 124-127;BREUL, 2015, p. 114-117).
For him religion is first and foremost "originally 'world view' or 'comprehensive doctrine' also in the sense that it claims the authority to structure a way of life as a whole" (HABERMAS, 2005b, p. 117). As such, it holds "a sense of what is missing and 'could be different'" (HABERMAS, 2008a, p. 84;REDER;SCHMIDT, 2008). This is precisely where it plays an important role at the level of the civil society (HABERMAS, 2001, p. 13).
Such a religion is certainly not a civil religion.
Ultimately, this is rather a "commodification of religion in conformity with the market" (HOCH- GESCHWENDER, 2007, p. 171), which dims the critical prophetic impulses from the hope for the Kingdom of God. Significant for his theory of religion, however, is now the way in which he does this. In a critical reformulation of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde's famous thesis, Habermas, in the wake of a kantian republicanism, assumes that under the inescapable conditions of the secular state, no worldview can be effective as a norm for all any longer. The democratic state is able to generate its legitimacy procedurally from the presupposed unconditional claims to validity of rational argumentation, only detached from religious and metaphysical traditions within the framework of communicative reason. This leads to an "autonomous justification of the constitutional principles that is rationally acceptable for all citizens according to their claim" (HABERMAS, 2008a, p. 138-140). In view of the functional differentiation of modernity and the pluralization processes, the constitutional state must act ideologically neutrally and may therefore only be based on principles that can be justified ideologically neutrally and can be accepted by believers, non-believers, and those of other faiths. However, in Habermas eyes the increasingly "derailing modernization", which can "wear down" the democratic bond and "emaciate" solidarity, refers to traditions outside procedural reason (HABERMAS, 2005b, p. 109).
Already practical reason misses its "own destiny when it no longer has the strength to awaken and keep awake in profane minds an awareness of the worldwide wounded solidarity, an awareness of what is missing, of what cries out to heaven" (HABERMAS, 2008c, p. 30;HABERMAS, 2008d, p. 95). And in view of increasing crises, the democratic state in particular needs an internally guided, persuasion-based legitimation of its citizens that goes beyond mere pragmatic acceptance. Such traditions can make possible the political commitment to the community that is expected of citizens "in the role of democratic co-legislators" (HABERMAS, 2005b, p. 109).
In this respect, the state relies on pre-political sources in order not to cut itself off from "increasingly scarce resources of meaning, solidarity  (RAWLS, 1993). Traditions are only legitimate at the level of the public insofar as they correspond to the "values of public reason", all of which assume that they can be accepted by everyone, both religious and non-religious citizens (RAWLS, 1993, p. 786). But this justifies a reservation, a condition, a proviso, which demands the translation of particular traditions into the secular reason accessible to all. While the public use of non-public reasons is subject to translation, the same does not apply to secular reason itself.
At this point, however, Habermas critically argues that there is an asymmetry here that is one-sidedly to the detriment of religious traditions and thus also counteracts the targeted integration of citizens in an equal and just society. In addition, even secular citizens could not know whether they were not cutting themselves off from religious traditions by privatizing their sense resources and buried intuitions in the process of marginalizing them. Therefore, a translation is also required of secular people, which is socially highly significant as much as it goes hand in hand with the critical self-reflection of secular reason and its dialectic.
Secular reason can only be appropriated in critical recourse (HABERMAS, 2005b, p. 133-138) The prerequisite for this, however, was the further development of the traditional concept of laicity in the sense of a "pluralistic laicity" (MACLURE; TAYLOR, 2011, p. 146). This would include the development of an "ethics of dialogue" as "political minimal morality" or an "overarching consensus" that the citizens would have to learn. They must accept the authority of the shared principles that underlie their political institutions, even though they are committed to different views of the good. In a way, this is a deepening of the ideal of tolerance that has enabled the end of religious conflicts. This type of society demands of its citizens that they "abstract" from their moral and procedures to what extent they should and can be effective for the public and of political influence (REDER, 2016, p. 254).
In this space of a discursive public sphere a public religion crystallises out (GABRIEL, 2008, p. 266-268;GRÜMME, 2009, p. 32-34). In it different worldviews, religions and politics enter into a discursive debate about fundamental orientations, values and practices. This public religion takes seriously the political-theoretical, cultural-scientific and historical analysis just alluded to, that in the strict sense the ideologically neutral constitutional state is in its decisions, its actions and its regulations "in fact never ideologically neutral", but is based on the "rivalry of the world views" (HOCHGESCHWENDER, 2007, p. 200;CASANOVA, 1994;TAYLOR, 2009 (MANEMANN, 2008b, p. 86). This "a priori of suffering" can orient the political discourse in a critical departure from a purely formal "a priori of understanding" (METZ, 1996, p. 46). At the same time, however, it becomes apparent with the same sharpness that the messianic surplus is lost precisely when politics takes possession of messianism. Only when messianic expectation and memoria passionis come together is a "messianic politics" immune from self-absolutisation and at the same time religion from a new integralism (MANEMANN, 2008b, p. 85;2008a, p. 116-118). Nevertheless, this can only happen according to the normative rules of discursive reason. The neutrality of the constitutional state lies only here, thus only on the procedural level (HOCHGESCHWENDER, 2007, p. 201). In this discourse then also the truth of faith is to be brought