An issue for Wegner’s theory about the conscious will: the Readiness Potential does not conclusively represent preparation for an action
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2017.3.25773Palavras-chave:
conscious will, Readiness Potential, action, experience.Resumo
The role of consciousness in the production of actions has received much attention from philosophy and neuroscience. Wegner (2002) claims that what he calls the conscious will plays no role in the causal production of human actions, and that it is just an illusion. I will argue that Wegner’s claim is mistaken, because his defense of the alleged illusion rests on how he conceives of what the Readiness Potential (RP) represents in a key experiment—Libet’s experiment—and this conception is mistaken. Therefore, Wegner has not offered a convincing reason to believe that humans are deluded about the way they produce their actions.
*** Um problema para a teoria de Wegener sobre a vontade consciente: Potencial de Prontidão não representa a preparação para uma ação de maneira conclusiva ***
O papel da vontade consciente na produção de ações tem recebido bastante atenção tanto da filosofia como da neurociência. Wegner (2002) afirma que o que ele chama de vontade consciente não desempenha nenhum papel na produção causal das ações humanas, e que a mesma é apenas uma ilusão. Será argumentado no presente artigo que a afirmação de Wegner está equivocada, porque a sua defesa da suposta ilusão está fundamentada em como ele concebe o que o Potencial de Prontidão representa em um experimento crucial—o experimento de Libet—e essa concepção está errada. Portanto, Wegner não oferece uma razão convincente para se crer que os seres humanos estão iludidos a respeito de como produzem suas ações.
Palavras-chave: vontade consciente, Potencial de Prontidão, ação, experiência.
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