BODILY INDIVIDUATION, BODILY RELATIONALITY – SCHELER'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY AND INFANT RESEARCH Individuação corporal, relacionabilidade corporal – a fenomenologia do corpo em Scheler e a pesquisa infantil

This article analyses two interrelated aspects of the phenomenological body – the fact of allowing a basic individuation and its being socially oriented from the beginning. To do that, I first present Scheler’s theories on the lived body, focusing on the notions of Leibschema and of a primary individuation. I then assess Scheler’s theory of the “undifferentiated flux” to show that it is only a prima facie impasse, and that an implicit body schema is present from birth; this seems to apply to the infant studies that find in newbors a “level 1” of detachment from the environment and an embodied selfawareness (Rochat, Fogel). However, the body schema shows an intrinsic relational aspect too. In the third part, I propose to apply Scheler’s theory of the direct perception of expressivity to the psychological theories of an innate intersubjectivity (Trevarthen) and a core intersubjectivity (Stern). Moreover, the development of pre-linguistic infants seems to be possible thanks to lived-body and expressive interactions, that show co-regulation (Fogel) and affective attunement (Stern) in interaction.


Introduction
In his Formalismusbuch, written between 1913 and 1916, Scheler deals with the problem of corporeality through a peculiar example that indicates the first steps of the so-called Leibschema.I call this case "the example of the newborn".When a child observes her feet for the first time, she is tempted to hit them, as if they did not pertain to her bodily dimension but were rather an external object.Scheler claims here that she needs to learn the optic image (das optische Bild) of her body, and to distinguish it from the optic image of the bed sheets in which she is. 1 So, where does the corporeal individuation emerge from?Does a newborn learn to differentiate her own corporeal sphere from the environment?And how could she ever do that, if she did not already have a structure (or schema) that allows her to feel this difference?
This example involves tangled phenomenological problems, first of all the definition of the longdebated notion of body schema, and secondly whether there is a distinction between this and the body image, which partially overlaps the optic image that Scheler assumes.Owning to the length and complexity of the debate on the body schema, a careful analysis of the problem cannot be addressed in this paper.On the whole, I agree with the differentiation between body schema and body image provided by Shaun Gallagher, who describes the body schema as a dynamic set of tacit bodily functions and performances.In other words, this results in close-to-automatic movements, which leaves one's attention free to focus on other tasks or objects.However, I do not share his characterization of it as "preconscious", since it concerns the pre-reflective, but still phenomenological layer of tacit governance of posture and movement. 2Differently, according to Gallagher the body image is «a complex set of intentional states and dispositionsperceptions, beliefs, and attitudes -in which the intentional object is one's own body», 3 which includes a perceptual, a conceptual and an affective dimensions.The perceptual aspect, in Scheler's example, corresponds to the optic image that the child learns to individuate as her own.
The phenomenological implications at stake deeply concern the question of the primacy of selfindividuation over a relational constitution of the human being.More specifically, is this body schema primarily and intrinsically relational, or is there a previous individual dimension that allows for a sense of self-other discrimination, from which babies can learn their own image?And last, are newborns and 1 GW II, p. 402.I refer in this paper to Scheler's complete works: SCHELER, M., Gesammelte Werke, Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag. 2 GALLAGHER, S., How the Body Shapes the Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, p. 26.As Zahavi remarks, Gallagher either uses a too narrow concept of consciousness, or includes subpersonal, neural processes in the prereflective experience of the active performance of the body schema.Cf.ZAHAVI, D., Self-awareness and Alterity, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999, pp.94-99 and footnote 24.In this article, I mean not only to discuss Scheler's theories from a theoretical point of view, but also to compare them with the empirical evidence coming from infant research.Scheler's insights for the debate on the body schema and for the interrelational dimension in early infancy have been, as far as I know, almost ignored. 4However, there seem to be some meeting points between recent studies on infants and Scheler's theories on the lived body and the perception of expressivity.Newborns are able to imitate some basic gestures from the first days of their lives: this leads to the hypothesis of a primary body schema from birth (if not before), that would explain how they can perform the same gesture without knowing their bodily image.Moreover, not only a sense of their own body is shown to exist by those experiments, but also a sense of self-other discrimination, and much before self-recognition in the mirror.
In this sense, one could further argue that the appeal to a primary intersubjectivity, and the phenomena of attunement and co-regulation move towards Scheler's theory, in case the basic level of empathy was conceived in terms of "perception" (Fremdwahrnehmung) and primacy of the expressive phenomena.I will first discuss the concepts of lived body and body schema in Scheler's research, and then investigate how "relational" this concept is to be interpreted, in order to discuss any evidence of an early capacity of empathy in infancy.

Leib and Leibschema in Scheler
Undoubtedly, the re-evaluation of a lived sphere of the body is one of the great merits of phenomenology.Scheler's most significant contributions to the subject of corporeality start between the end of his first period and the beginning of the second one.external and internal perception, and states that the ownership and sameness of one's own body are immediate facts of both kinds of perception, without any doubt about self-attribution. 7Another aspect that is worth noticing in this text is the reference to a pre-noetic dimension of the lived body in action.In fact, Scheler examines the conditions that allow a fluid action, i.e.: normal volition aims for the realization of the desired content directly, e.g. to leave the room.Any volition of the means necessary for this purpose, like "to step up to the door", "to press the handle", the execution of the movements necessary to the aim, and so on, is subordinated to that finalistic content and occurs through quasi-automatic impulses, insofar as no specific hindrance comes up8 .
What is the connection between the concept of Leib that he maintains and the description of a prereflective purpose?It is remarkable that here Scheler reveals the theorization of a proto-concept of body schema.As stated in the introduction, the body schema is to be conceived as a dynamical structure that is implicit in movements and maintenance of the posture, and furthermore enables attention to focus on the external world.Such being the premise, the "normal volition" described by Scheler implies precisely the transparency of the body that makes it an implicit background which allows to accomplish a simple goaloriented task without explicit effort on the movement.In other words, thanks to the body schema we experience a prevailing focus on the external world rather than on our body, which is why we can leave the room fluidly.
Some years later, in Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Scheler goes back to this problem and defines it by the clear phrase «das Schema unseres Leibes». 9The claim about this concept is even more radical: the unity of our body, which was already stressed in Die Idole, cannot arise from sensorial data like vision or touch plus some "organic sensations" (Organempfindungen). 10 Hence, the phenomenologist asserts that the body schema is a structure that would exist even in the absence of any sensations, being rather the precondition for them.In other words, the proprioceptive unity does neither come from the body image in its visual and tactile aspects plus some sensations pertaining to the does not need to be learnt, different is the phenomenology of the body image, which is instead not yet formed and connected to the schema.
It is important to mention one last text of Scheler's that concerns corporeality.In 1928, before his death, he gave a conference paper to the publishing house Otto Reichl in Darmstadta text that was to be published with the title Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. 12Here he develops an open and harsh anti-Cartesian criticism, against the dualistic conception which forgot the unity of life in living beings (of which the psychical and the lived-body dimensions are two aspects), and the impulsive structure (Triebstruktur) that is distinctive of every animal, mankind included.Scheler refers to an elementary level of individuation that pertains to the animal Leibschema and its contents, linked to the "retroaction" or "feedback" (Rückmeldung).This means that the animal is given to itself a second time, or in other words individuated, thanks to the separation between sensorial and motor systems, and to the consciousness that it has of its body schemata and sensible contents. 13Consciousness does not imply the explicit selfconsciousness that only mankind owns and that allows it to objectify the psychic processes themselves.
However, although the animal has a non-reflective kind of consciousness that differentiates it from a merely-animated plant, it lives still immersed in the environment, so only at a primary level of individuation. 14But thisit should be highlightedoccurs thanks to the body schema.
However, some questions might be asked about the difference between non-human animals and mankind: first of all, does the animal have a body image?Scheler would deny at least the conceptual aspect of it, since the animal is ecstatically immersed in its environment, and this means that it cannot properly have objects, therefore it cannot objectify its body. 15But is the difference between a cub and a child more basic, namely, does it concern the body schema?Guido Cusinato rightly points out that, contrarily to an animal, a human being goes through a never-ending birth. 16While, for instance, a dolphin is born with a quite well-developed body schema (that is, it can swim immediately after birth), a newborn is in this sense poorly equipped.In fact, she cannot walk nor survive without being taken care of, and her body schema itself is in continuous development to reach its full complexity (coordination of movements, capacity to sit upright, to stand straight, to walk, and so on).My investigation will concern two interconnected facets of the discussed body schema in Scheler, together with the examination of some infant studies: 12 GW IX. 13

Is the infant self-individuated?
According to Scheler's theory of the body schema, this bodily aspect is a pre-noetic unity in consciousness, a structure that allows all animals sensations and movements, and a primary individuation.
Why then would it be controversial to claim that a child is born with this kind of individuation?A reason for misunderstanding might be the theory of the undifferentiated flux (undifferenzierte Strom) in Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, which claims that the I-thou difference emerges from a state of undifferentiation and that one lives more in the others than in oneself.Scheler also states that the child slowly raises her "mental" head (sein eigenes geistiges Haupt) above the stream, and «finds herself as a being who also, at times, has feelings, ideas and tendencies of his own».17But which kind of self are we here dealing with?Does Scheler deny any self-individuation in early infancy?
Merleau-Ponty criticizes Scheler for reducing the problem of consciousness to a sort of panpsychism, in which «there is no individuation of consciousness». 18How could a non-self-conscious subjecthe wondersever emerge from that undifferentiated flux?However, a more complex view of individuation comes clearly from the examination of Scheler's concepts of the body and the body schema.
Given his division between sensible, vital, psychic values and values of the "holiness" (explained mainly in the Formalismusbuch), that correspond to various aspects of any human being on top of which is the personality, it is apparent that the body schema cannot be at the level either of the spiritual values or the psychic ones.A lived body is not even a mere sum of sensations, as it has been shown, and it is something that pertains to the animal world.So when Scheler speaks of a "mental head", he refers to the third level of values, which in other terms would be applied to the quoted sentence as an "explicit selfconsciousness": the formation of an autonomous psychic self, that distinguishes itself from the contagion of tradition and of the people around her, comes with a more complex kind of individuation.But, if he attributes individuation and (pre-reflective) consciousness to the animal world, it would make no sense to claim that his of undifferentiated flux affects the lived-bodily level too.Animals have a bodily consciousness, even though a psychic level of values is not mentioned by Scheler when writing about them.Moreover, going back to the example of the newborn, Scheler denies a body image to the child, but the fact of hitting her feet would not be possible for the child in the absence of a body schema.
In 1977, Meltzoff and Moore started a series of experiment that tested the capacity of gesture imitation, like tongue protrusion and mouth opening, in infants since the first days of birth.The two authors interpret their results in favour of «the neonate's capacity to represent visually and proprioceptively perceived information in a form common to both modalities». 19Another way to read the well-known experiments by Meltzoff and Moore could be to individuate empirical evidence of the presence of a body schema from birth.How could a newborn otherwise imitate any gesture, if she could neither have any insight of the localization of her mouth, nor any pre-reflective knowledge of the embodied possibilities to perform those movements?
According to Rochat, there are 5 levels of self-awareness that the infant develops within the first years of life.He argues that a neonate is not born with a level 0, that is a level of confusion or zero degree of self-awareness.Although Rochat refers to the child's self-perception in the mirror, he states something interesting that goes towards a primary individuation through the body schema: It appears that immediately after birth, infants are capable of demonstrating already a sense of their own body as a differentiated entity: an entity among other entities in the environment (level 1).This is evident, for example, when observing the rooting response of newborns and what triggers it.When touching the cheek of newborns, they tend to orient their head toward the touch stimulation.(…) From birth, infants differentiate between self-vs.non-self touch, between stimulation originating from either the own body or an external source 20 .
In other words, neonates show a self-individuation that relies on the implicit differentiation between a quality of first-person and the external world.This occurs through the body schema, since the first-personal quality of bodily experiences shows in the first place a bodily I-thou differentiation (see the originary unity that pertains to the body schema according to Scheler).Even Scheler would not deny this claim, if the "I-thou" is not intended on the psychological, explicit level.Self-awareness remains implicit until the middle of the second year, according to Rochat: it is expressed in perception and action.interaction she will learn bodily, emotional and cognitive skills, such as walking or sharing emotional responses to a situation. 25reover, it is interesting to notice that infants seem to be predisposed to what Scheler calls expressivity (Ausdruck).More precisely, to state that the Leib (and not the Körper) is originarily given is not only true for self-awareness, but also for the perception of others, and the lived body is, according to Scheler, primarily a field of expressions. 26If someone, for instance, opens up in a smile with half-closed corners of her eyes, and comes with outstretched arms protruded towards us, we will not need an inferential thought to understand her intention of a hug and the cheerful mood in which she is.It is no surprise then, if the theory of expressivity is held true, that a newborn just few days old is already capable of imitating certain facial gestures, since she probably perceives them as meaningful much sooner than other gestures that need time to be learnt.Moreover, if the Leib and expression are primarily given in perception, it follows that animation too is a primary fact.Learning is instead a de-animation (Entseelung), not an animation (Beseelung) of a körperlich dimension. 27e primacy of expressivity seems to be confirmed by infant studies, since neonates manifest sensitivity to their partners' expressions and a tendency to communicate emotions and intentions bodily.
The studies by Meltzoff and Moore examined show not only that newborns own a body schema and are able to imitate expressions thanks to it, but also that they are prone to enter a number of interactive situations from the beginning of their lives.Meltzoff himself interprets the results of his experiments as the presence of a primary sense of self, which increasingly develops from proprioceptive awareness.This, combined with the affective tone felt in the imitative effort, plus the social mirroring experienced with the caregiver, strengthens the infant's sense of agency.According to him, the child possesses a "body scheme" from birth, and this is extended and improved by social experiences and self-practice. 28Besides, it has been proved that the correct cognitive maturation of a child finds its basis in a coherent exchange of expressions and emotions.The post-natal depressed mothers, for instance, show insensitivity, hostility or poor expressive response to the child, and this impairs the infant's normal emotional regulation and cognitive development. 29odily to enter into a communicative and cooperative relationship with them by some transfer of the feeling of body action». 30More radically than Meltzoff, he appeals to the evidence that the organs connected with human communicative expression and sensitivity are developed during the early foetal stage, and that neurosciences show the early embryonic formation of the regions regulating eye movements, facial expressions and vocalizations. 31In an interesting way, Trevarthen also remarks that a proto-cultural interchange can be seen in newborns that draw an adult into synchronized negotiations of an arbitrary action, or in other words, a neonate is capable of an interactive, even teasing play with adults.Moreover, she shows to prefer interaction when certain human features are present (sounds, odours, cadences of movements, and so on). 32This proves the infant's early ability of adapting her behaviour to others, which is already a sign of communicative intents.It is no surprise then that this author argues for an innate intersubjecitivity. 33e sensitivity to others' expressions and the communicative tendencies are shown even more clearly after the second-month transition.In this early transformation, face-to-face interaction and even the infant's active engagement increase, thanks to the improvement in the child's neural functions, to her motor development, and to the embodied change of her kind of contact with the caregiver (being less held often leads to major visual connection). 34sides interaction, other relevant paradigms are the ones of co-regulation and attunement.Coregulation is a term used by Alan Fogel to describe the continuous adjustments that infant and caregiver perform in order to synchronise emotions and actions in communication, such as postural modifications and vocal and facial gestures.This is particularly visible after the second-month transition, and shows creativity and an active engagement in communication from both partners. 35In his turn, Daniel Stern has recently supported a "core intersubjectivity" which manifests itself from birth and shows the capacity to and that correspond to the momentary changes in feeling states involved in the organic processes of being alive». 45Those vitality affects are experienced in a way that a gesture is not the mere sum of qualities like timing, intensity and shape (e.g., Stern says, rapid acceleration, speed, and fullness of display).A child will perceive the forcefulness of the gesture. 46Which indicates, again, the primacy of Ausdruck.As it has been shown, he did not deny the infant an implicit self-awareness that originates in the body schema, which is evident from other texts and especially from the "example of the newborn" in the Formalismus.A "corporeal" level of self-individuation, that according to Scheler allows the animal being to detach from the environment, is supported also by Rochat and Fogel, who assert the existence of a "level 1" of individuation and of an embodied self-awareness (ESA).Moreover, the well-known experiments by Meltzoff and Moore imply that the infant must possess already an implicit body schema from birth, in order to imitate gestures without having the image of their body yet.

Conclusion
On the other hand, the same experiments also demonstrate that the body schema is intrinsically relational, the baby being able to deal with basic gestures since the first hours after birth.I have shown that, despite this bodily self-individuation, the body schema of an infant is necessarily incomplete without interactions, and it is constituted in such a way that expressivity is the first feature that she catches in others.I have examined Scheler's notion of Ausdruck, which proves that the body schema is the ground for relationality too: what we perceive in others is a unity of expression, before splitting the single parts of a Körper.I have considered several insights in infant research as pertinent evidence, and suggest reconsideration of an innate intersubjectivity (Trevarthen) or core intersubjectivity (Stern).Even prelinguistic development indicates that the primary form of learning is through bodily communication, coregulation (Fogel) and affective attunement (Stern), which allows to share Scheler's theoretical claim on the direct perception of expressive phenomena.In the end, whether or not the body and body schema are 45  primarily individuated or relational is a catch-22 problem: interaction is possible from birth thanks to the body schema and therefore to a primary individuation, but at the same time bodily individuation is shown to be intrinsically open to alterity and developing through social contacts constantly.

I
have so far analysed empirical evidence both of the primary individuation, and of the intrinsically social component of the body schema, which by infant research is proved to manifest a tendency towards understanding expressivity in others.The question of the primacy of the individuation or the intrinsic relationality of the body has been examined through Scheler's theory of the Leib and some scientific evidence of early infant development.I have claimed that a basic form of individuation is present in Die Stellung and resolves some prima facie impasses that could be detected in Scheler's theory of the undifferentiated flux.
11So when Scheler writes the "example of the newborn" in the Formalismus, this is what he has in his mind: the child comes to the world with an already-given unity of her lived body.How could she otherwise try to hit her feet, if she did not have a body-schematic dimension beforehand?What she learns to distinguish, is which optic image pertains to the bed sheets or to her body.It can be then desumed that, while according to Scheler the body schema Bodily individuation, bodily relationality -Scheler's phenomenology of the body and infant research organs, nor from a physical body (Körper)+animation.The body as Leib can therefore come to evidence as «a completely unitary [einheitlicher] phenomenal state of affairs, and as the subject of «feeling» in such and such condition (So-und Anders«befindens»)».
child seems to have already a body schema at birth, since she is able to imitate facial gestures, which would not be possible without an implicit knowledge of her body; this proves that the human being enters the world with a certain self-individuation, if we share Scheler's theory in Die Stellung.But what are the precise levels of self-awareness and self-individuation of an infant?2) Leib and Körper are two different aspects of the same body, of which only the lived dimension is primarily given.The Leibschema, however, is not complete at birth: does it need interactions in order to achieve full development?And how is it possible, given the studies on the matter that I am going to examine, that children seem to perceive some expressions as meaningful from early infancy?Do they show a tendency to exchange emotions and intentions bodily?As Scheler states in Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, the lived body is first of all a field of expressions, so what is given to perception in the first place are emotions and intentions.
Bodily individuation, bodily relationality -Scheler's phenomenology of the body and infant research individuation, bodily relationality -Scheler's phenomenology of the body and infant research As Trevarthen claims, «[i]nfant human beings imitate other humans, not just to act like them, but Bodily individuation, bodily relationality -Scheler's phenomenology of the body and infant research STERN, M.D., The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, London: Karnac Books, 1985, p. 156. 46STERN, M.D., The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View from Psychoanalysis and Developmental Psychology, London: Karnac Books, 1985, p. 158.